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ASSI'_,q_4I':NTOF CNASll FIRE
,, IL_ZARD 01" M{2 I,'UELEDAIRCP_I;'T
(LI). lir_w_r, (,.WJ.Lt]._n,E.I. Ver_aw
SUY_IARY
Liquid hydrogen (ill2) is a prJ.mary ea;Id:ldate fuel for future t_rmlslmrv
a_.i'eraft. Studies performed for NASA h:lvo show,l it_ adwtntagos in almotO'
every caVo_:ory of comparison, Accordingly, when t'h_ international air traus-
port industry lu forced to turn vo an alternative for collventiona2 potroleam_
base Jet A for reasons of eitht,r price or availability, or both, LH2 is ex-
pected to be a leading contender.
In the meantime, there i$ much technology development which should pro-
ceed in order that, when the tiara for a decision te at hand, tile decision
regarding the clloice of fuel for the industry can be made on a credible basin,
giving full consideration to all the factors which are tmportaut. One of the
factor_ about which there is a serious lack of credible data is safety. How
safe is liquid hydrogen compared to other fuels? What special precautionsshould be taken in design to accommodate it proFerly? In event of a crash
t in which passengers and crew survive the impact, would t_.y be exposed re
more or less hazard from fire or explosion if Ll[2 Is the fuel_ rather than
other fuels? - how about surrounding areas? What studies and experiments
should be performed to resolve such issues?
It The subject study was performed to determine answers to these questions.P
Four scenarios describing situations involving fuel spills which call and do
arise in commercial transport aircraft were studied to determine the hazard
t
to airplane passengers and aur.oundtnge posed by LII2 if it is employed as the
aircraft fuel. The find*lags were then compared with results derived for liquid
methane (LCH4), aviation grade kerosine (Jet A), and wide-cut gasoline (dP-4).
_Lockheed Ntesile and Space Company, Inc.
tJohn Hulr Institute
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]n _Ullllllal:y,o11 tl|oba_:[tl,c_|:thl_all,;dyfil_l_,.!rlol'111_._Ii|,II2 W;H; J.llsd to b¢'
a safor fne_ tbafl ally of tho a_her _ni]dJda_t;, T|lo p;i_mqlgor_ o11 ho;trd, i,ed
paoplu ¢ltlCl pr(ipt_rty In tb¢_ iulmedlato snrFouiidllig_, would |ruth hv u_pot_od t(,
loss hazard If a crashed aircraft wore fueled with I.II2.
q..'hiti _;osullttt from Lltrq¢_ futuhmluntal coiIt_hlcq'_/t Io|lt_: Ih*_ I.II2 Inltkt; srt,
loaa apL to sufJ.'cr dalllllgLl lYL,_aultil|g lit tq)l.Jled fut!] ; .If tq_tllc¢l, l.II2 wqmrfztm.
be(_om_s bueyant, arid dtttslpatus tnvo tim atmot_pherv so rnptdly tt minimizes
Llm hazard; finally, if Lira vapor cloud 1_ tgntted, tim aim, rind duratioe of
a fire from splll.ed I,}12 are both t_ignt_!icantly let, s than with any otlmr l:ucl..
_ ill 2 tanku are considered le_u apt re be damai;ed because
1) being mounted in tim fuselage, LII2 tanks expose a far smaller
dimension to frontal impact, compared wi_h t:unvcn_ional fuel whtch
is stored in tile wing and occupies nearly the entire span.
2) they are designed _o withstand a significantly higher pressure ,tlmn
the re_t of the fuselage and are therefore less apt to be the l>t_int
of failure in a survivable crash.
In the ¢_.ven_a tank is ruptured and there is a large spill of feel, LII2
doe_; net spread as far as other fuels, it evaporates le much shorter time,
becomes buoyant almost immediate-_y, and finally, rises and dissipates into
the atmosphere so rapidly that very little hazard is presenued to surroundings
eutsid_ the It_mediate area of the crash, Fur o.xample, the fol.lowin_,resnl.ts
were calculated for a survivabls crash slteation involving spillage of nearly
half _he fuel load of alrcraf_ designed to carry 400 passengers [0,190 _n
(5500 u.mi,) :
Vapor Cloud
Liquid Time
Start to Rtsu bi_sil)ntedQuaut ity Spread to
Fuel Spilled Radius Vaporize Time Distance Time Dlstance llclp, ht
I (kg) (m) (s) (_) (m) (s) (m) 0")
LII2 12,600 35 32 12 1.0 146 411 575
LCII4 34,398 61 117 1,560 624 1,624 713 72
,lP-4 42,210 143 785 Does not r:fs(_ 11,736 6,816 0
,let A 42,210 331 * * *
• The vapor pressure ef Jet A is nc_ htgh _,!I|Otigh lit standard atmosplmrI':
conditions to form a combustible mixture with the aLine)sphere;,
2
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Filla)]y, in avan_ _|le npi].].ad feel in iglti[od, the duration of tllo LII2
fire wtmld be no brief it would nat h,_at tht_ funtdaff, t_ ta tht_ point nf c,Hl_apno.
an would be tll_ cane w_tlL th_ oMier fufda, nit* rhp pana_llg_*ro wmdd be mlf_, If
_|lay n_ay J.n tllu_r neath until _lm fee|., f_d flrv _ hurut_d out, For extu_plv,
In _'lm aircraft eranh _:[tuut:l.oll ,lut_ c_tod, the remdtlnR flrt, will burn ltm,|f
ou_ in almuC 22 nueondtJ £n t:he (_'aao of T,II2, vor,m_ al_progJ.illutt!]y 63 Ilcweud_i
for LCII4, mort_ _han 10 minu_en for JP-4. mid (_veu lo1|_,_q' for ,|_t A.
The sebJt_,cL s_udy reprt_en_ a preliminary invtm_lgutton. The fin(ling_
leak very fnvornbl.e for hydro},,en. Ilowevt_r, ic mu_t be rt_coguized that there
are many other canon and cireumt_anceu _o be analy_,.ed_ I:he Coo]t_ for ana],ynJ._;
need to be improved, and oxporimenta_ teat'ing taunt be performed to entab]i_d_
a benin for val, idaeion of the eempt_er mode] renulgn before eomp].ete and final.
eone].eniona can be reached.
-- • dl
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SYHIIOI,8AND UNITf_
l
I1 R cell fltllllt
i AI., - ill'l!ll of lluff I:li'_ee_h whti'h gill" ta olltrlllul, d (in_)
I A_ • tires of liqut.d pllol (111l)
h - l_ouatatit
i - specific Ill, at ,'-apacity of all" tit. Collstilllt |!rt!Hl_ure (cal/gl)
Cpa
C ,', nllectftc heat captlctty (if gafteouti fel!l at cotlstaut prel_tiuro (cal/gl)
C -' specific heat capacity of puff: at Constant presgut'e (caZlgK)PP
d = leilgth pllrault!tel: defiuiug _urface roughtio_s (lit)s
e = vapor presuure of water (mb)
e '= uaturatiou water vapor I)rensttre iu the puff (rob) *
ap
E - evaporation rate of liquid fuel (m/s)
f = Fanning friction factor for open channel flow
Fr ,_ Froude number of the liquid flow
g - acceleration of gravity (m/s 2)
H " enthalpy of air entraitied during one time increment (cal)
H = enthalpy of puff at start of a time increment (cal.)
P
hfg it latent heat of vaporizatJon (kW acc/kg)
L = length of puff in downwind direction (m)x
1, - erogswiud (cruse runway) width of puff (m)
Y
L it latent heat of water wiper coudeeuattou (cal/kg)
w
L' = latent heat of funioe of ltqutd water (cal/kg)
w
= maximum rate of vaporization fre_t the liquid spread (kg/uec)
m " maom of atr eutrailied during one time: tt_cremeet (g)
e
I_ = maximum nuiss rate of vaporfzat:ion per tttitt spill length (kg/see.M)
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mf " tuna, nf fu_) tll puff (M)
lllp " .m.t_ _f puff aL ¢_Lal:t of kimu islcremm_t (X)
mw - _mtm of w_it_r mltrulli,_d duriug 4ule tJ11m Jncr_mmlt (g)
I_A " tt_ati fl,owrat_ .1 air (kR/.t_c)
,11,. " Illa.tt flowratu of fual W|lmr (kg/.uc)
M - tool,ocular wct.ght of fucl vapor or air
Ma - molecular weight ol air (g/mole)
Mf . molecular weight oJ' fucl (g/tool,e)
Mp " molecular wuipht of puff mixture (g/mole)
Mw m mole,'ular wei_.ht of!water (R/mole)
n • Mauniugs roughuess coefftc.teut
t_
P = atmospheric pressure (dytms cm TM)
p " exponent of height ratio In wind t_pccd profile (-)
Qo _ total volume of the liquid spll.led (m3)
Qo = volum_ rate of the liquiJ ::pill (m3/s)
Q' " volume of liquid _pill per unit of upill canterline length (m3/m)
O
q"c _ c nvective heat flux from flames (kW/m2)
" = incident radiation heat flux from flames (kW/m 2)q F
!r q"R = absorbed radiation heat flux from flame_ (kW/m 2)
q" = heat rate per tu*Jt area to the solid surface (kW/m2)
r '_ puff radtuu (m)
rm - maximum radius oll the spr_,ad from the center (m)
R* = universal gat; constant (urg/mele K)
Re = Reynolds number of the flow
t = time elapsed _Jnce [.tartof vaporization from liquid (seconds)
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t m = Lima tQ maximum axis] spread (s)
_r - time Increment (a)
T - temperature of air (K)a
T_ - flam_ temperature (K)
T - puff temperature at star_ of t_mo increment (K)
P
T' - Intet_cdlate puff temperature aftu_ balaualng sensible hca_
P transfer (K)
T" - intermediate puff temperature of_er condcusinfi water vapor (K)P
V T''' - intermediate puff temperature after fraezlng water droplets (K)
P
T"" • intermediate puff temperature after any melting of ice cryetala
P and re-evaperation Of water droplets (K)
u - wind speed (m/s)
u • horizontal downwind speed of puff (m/s)P
u - entrainment speed (m/s)
e
u L = first term of entrainment speed (m/s)
u 2 - second term of entrainment speed (m/a)
Vk - aircraft velocity along spill llne (m/s)
VA • volu_etrlc flawrate of air at atmeapherlc temperature and
pressure (m3/s)
I V - mean horlzontal velocity ef the liquid flow (m/s)
V - volume of puff (m3)
Vt • volume of puff a_ end of time increment (m3)
VF = volumetric flowrate of fuel at atmospheric temperature and
pressure (m3/s)
V = initial puff volume (m3)0
V - volume of air entrained during one time interval (m3)e
VE = rate of fall of still liquid surface (m/s)
w - vertical puff speed (m/s)
5
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x - _xial dietanee from the center of the ept]i ]ine (m)
x = maximumh.lf axial eprend, fromapil] centorline (m)m
Zp - downwind die,ante o£ puff from orlSiw (m)
_x - change in downwind dlsplacoment (m)
Ymlu " mlulmum combustible mole fraction of fuel i. the alr
z " hel_l_ of puff above ground (m)
z - reference height for wind speed profile (m)
o
z - height of puff above ground (m)
&Zp - puff thickness in vertical direction (m)
_" - lapse _ate of _empe_atura in the atmosphere (K/m)
6 - liquid flow depth (m)
, eF - effective flame emissivity
Pa = density of air at height of puff (g/m3)
pg - density of gaseous fuel at i atmosphere pressure and boiling
t point (g/m 3)
P_ - density of liquid fuel (glm3)
pp - density of puff (g/m3)
k - wave velocity (m/s)
_L = liquid viscosity (kg/s m)
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SECTION 1
INTRODUCTION
This is the final report of a study performed for NASA-Lewls Research
Center to assess the hazard posed by liquid hydrogen when used as fuel in
- commercial transport aircraft. In addition to liquid hydrogen (LN2) 0 the
hazards presented by three other fuels were also calculated for comparison.
The other fuels were liquid methane (LCH4) , Jet A (aviation grade kerosine
currently used in commercial transport aircraft), end JP-4 (the wldecut
gasoline used as Jet fuel by the Air Force).
e
Four specific scenarios or descriptions of incidents leading to spilled
fuel were specified by NASA to serve as a basis for the safety analysis. The
incidents ranged from a very small leak such as might result from a crack in
a faulty weld on a fuel llne or tank, to a catastrophic crash which would
cause simultaneous rupture of all the fuel tanks on board the aircraft.
The study was initiated because LH2 is a candidate fuel to he used when
Jet A, produced from crude oil, is no longer available to the world transport
fleets on an economically acceptable basis. Previous studies conducted for
NASA have shown numerous advantages which can be gained by using LH21'2'3'4.
!_ These include
• Global availabillt_. It can be made from a renewable resource, water,
using any source of energy which might be locally available. Fossil
resources are not required.
• Pollution. Its major product of combustion is water vapor. It emits
none of the noxious effluents of carbon-contalnlng fuels save a mini-
mum amount of NOx.
• Noises. Because they are lighter and therefore can use smaller engines,
LH2-fueled aircraft would be about half as objectionable to airport
neighbors.
8
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1r !i
m _. Coal is a. example of an energy resourc.e which can be used
_o produc_ allyof the alternate fuels, Fewer tolls of coal would be
required to produce tlm fuel used by aircraft to fly their design
misfliousif I,II2 is the fuel.
i • Pireet.O_r_gl_l[_ Coat. Lll2-fuel, ed aircraft can be competitive iu DOdtlSillg currant fuel. production technology 27. .lith advanced processes,
I.}t2 can be produced from coal and water at costs which offer signifi--
I cant advantage.
The relative safety of I1t2 has been subject to question. The presentb
i study is an important step toward establishing a sound basis for Judgement
on this matter. In addition to providing a preliminary answer to tile question
i of how LI{2 compares with the other fuels in terms of crash safety, it also
provides suggestions for additional analyses and experiments which are con-
sidered necessary for final resolution of the problem.
I
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SECTION 2
TECIINICAL APPROACI!
2.1 Study Team Organization and Work Plan
The study team consisted of representatives from three companic,_; selected
to provide expertise in the diverse technology areas needed to perform this
study effectively and efficiently.
The Lockheed-Callfornla Company was the prime contractor to NASA and
managed the study. LCC also reviewed transport aircraft accident data from
various sources to derive a basis for establishing what would constitute •
credible damage associated with each of the crash scenarios specified by NASA.
These damage assessments ware then considered in conjunction with aircraft
designed for each of the subject fuels to specify typical fuel spill rates
and quantities for each scenario.
Under subcontract to LCC the Thermal Sciences Laboratory of Lockheed
Missiles and Space Company, Inc. (LMSC) was responsible for analyzing the
hazard resulting from spill of the liquid fu:i.Ls. A computer model was created
by Mr. Richard Citma to characterize the spreading and vaporization of volatile
liquid spilled in both a radial and an axial pattern. The latter represented
the spill situation where, for example, an aircraft strikes an obstacle during
a landing shortly after touchdown and spills fuel during deceleration to a
stop. A radial spill pattern would be produced when impact with an ob,_tsc]n
stops the aircraft immediately.
The geometry and mixing characteristics of the ch>ud of vaporized fuel
as it disperses into the atmosphere were modeled by Dr. Erle Walther and co-
workers at John Muir Institute. The geometry of the cloud, the l>rofl]e of
the flammable mixture within it, and the path followed by the dispersing cloud
under various atmospheric conditions were needed to provide informat:ion about
lO
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the axles t' and duratien of the exposure to hazard of the aircraft passengers
and the area surro_nding the crash scene. For examp]o, the tilne--history of
the geometry and location of th¢_ flammable ,.lxruru withia the dinperstug cloud
provided information about tim potential size of fire which m_ght: re,_ult if
the aloud were ignited at various times.
Another type of hazard which was explored by LMSC rcla*:ed to tile problem
of how to handle a small leak of fuel into an internal cavity in the airpl;me.
There is the possibility that if such a leak occurs, an explosive mixture
could develop and a detonation result, The problem was resolved by determin-
ing, for various size leaks, the quantity of air flow required to assure that
a flammable mixture could net develop in the compartment as a whole. A
flammable mixture will always exist loea!ly at the leak source of course.
Finally, hazard to passengers inside the aircraft cabin was evaluated for
the case where the outside of the fuselage is exposed to flames from burning
fuel spilled as a result of one of the survivable crash scenarios.
2.2 Study Guidelines
The objectives of the study were:
• To assess the hazards associated with non-normal and crash landings,
failed takeoffs, end ground accidents i_,_olvln8 turbine-powered air-
craft fueled with liquid hydrogen (LH2).
• To compare LH2-fueled aircraft with similar deslgns fueled with liquid
methane, Jet Ap and JP-4, on the basis of:
Post-crash fuel system damage
Potential deflagratlon and detonation hazard
Survivability potential for persons in and adjacent to the damaged
aircraft
• To formulate a program of reeearch end tearing found to be needed to
fill technological gaps,
The hazards associated with LH2 were to be evaluated and compared with
those from liquid methane (LCH4), Jet A, and JP-4 in connection with the
following accident scenarios:
II
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1, h nnn-norma] landing or ground accident which results ill fuel system
Insulation damage mid/or fuel systole damage permitting liquid hydro-
geu to vent, _neape, leak or run out of a punctured tank or broken
1 inc.
2. h survivab].o crash landll_g t_r failed [.akeoff where damaf,c to fuel.
tankage or l_lms results in massive release of liquid hydrogen after
tile aircraft has come to rest,
3. A survivable crash landing o_" failed takeoff where damage to fuel
tankage or lines results ill massive release of liquid hydrogen upon
impact and during aircraft deceleration.
4. A nonsurvivable or eatast'rophiccrash resulting in the maximum rate
of energy release in the form of a conflagration and/or expl.osion.
12
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SECTION 3
INPUT DATA
In this section, da_a required a_ input to perfor_ the crush hazard
analyses of each of tile four fuels illthe slLuations Sl)_elfied by NASA are
presented. In turn, subs_,ctions present data on pertlnont properties of each
of the fuels; results are described of previous expsriments with LH 2 and LCII4
which were performed to assess some of their safety-related characteristics;
typical designs of transport aircraft for each of the fuels are described
which were used as a basis for establishing damage likely to result from the
specified crashes; results of study of aircraft accident records are reported;
and finally, the damage selected as representative of that likely to occur to
the specified aircraft in the sub,oct crash scenarios is described, along
with resulting fuel spill rates and quantities. These fuel spill data are
used in work described in subsequent sections in evaluation of the consequences
of the spills.
3.1 Fuel Characteristics
A number of properties of tile four fuels considered during this study
are presented in table i. The properties selected for presentation include
some which arc of general interest in comparing fuels for the aircraft appli-
cation; most are properties which were involved in the analysis of hazards
associated with spills resulting from the kind of aircraft crashes postulated
for thzs study.
As noted on the table, the propertles of the cryogenic fuels, L}I2 and
LCH4, were: t_ken from reference 5, a rccen_ compilation by the Center for
Chemical Engineering at the National Bureau of Standards in Boulder, Colorado,
The data for Jet A and JP-4 were primer;l> derived from the respective speci-
fications for tlle two fuels, references 6 and 7, except as noted in the table.
13
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TABT,I_ I, - fdI_LI,_CTI_I)PI{OI_I_IL'_'IE,_DI,' I"HJ_L_; 'i
Hydrugnlz(5) Methane(1_) JutA (U) JP.4(7)
lqomlnn)Composition t12 CI14 CII1.93 C)t1.93
M_locul_rWoillht 2.QIG 1G.04. ,_1(_S(A) .'-.132(8)
!
Heatof Combustion(low),k J/G 120 50.0 42.0 42.8
LiquidDensity,g/cm3ot283 K 0.071' 0.423" ~ 0.811 ...0.774
BoilingPoint,K {at1Atmosphere) 20.27 112 440to 039 333to 519
FreezingPoint,K 14.4 91 233 215
SpecificHeat*.J/g K 9.69 3.50 1.98(9) 2.04(9)
Heatof Voporlzetion.J/g 446 510 360(9) 344(9)
(at 1Atmosphere)
VaporPressure,kPe - - 19
DiffusionVel.in NTPAir,cm/s _ 2.00 _0.51 <0.17 <0.17
BuoyantVel.in NTPAir,m/s 1.2to 9 0.0to 6 NonBuoyant NonBuoyant
ID FlammabilityLimitsinAir.Vol.% 4.0to 75.0 5.3to 15.0 0.6to4.7(9) 0.8to5.9(9)
VaporizationRatewig Burning, 2.5to 5.0 0.05to0.5 N/A 0.005to0.02
cm/min(FromLiquidPool)
Min.IgoitionEnergyinAir.mJ 0.02 0.29 0.25(10) 0.25(10)
AutoignitionTamp.,K 859 013 _.900 >500
Rateof LiquidLoweringof 3to 6.6 0.3 to 1.2 0.17_5) 0.20(5)
BurningPool,cm/min
BurningVeI.in NTPAir,cm/s 265to 325 37to 45 10(10) 381(10)
FlameTampin Air(Stoichiometric).K 2318 2146 2200(10) 2200(10)
ThermalEnerGyRadiatedto 17to 25 23to 33 30to42 30to42
Surroundings%
DetonabilityLindtsinAir.Vol.% 18.3to59.0 6.3 to 13.5 N/A 1.1tn 3.3
_At NormalSoilingPoint
NTP '_ NormMTampqraturaa_dPressure
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3,2 Prevlem_ Safety Experi_l|LN
i Tller_ is a surl}rislngly IileJlgt_r llls_' 'V of we]l_ergal_Iz_d, sci_.tlflcu]ly
exocutad safely ozl)erilllt_nt's conducted wlLII eitht_,r LI]2 or LCI]4 _o e_tablish
the hat, ore atl_d el(tout of hazards associated with large _ntltaatatteouu .pi] ;Is,
or lea 8 durat:lon 8p:[l.ls of s_zable quo.ntities.
A search was made for experimental evidence to be us,,d fox" w_lidation of
the analytical models created for use in the subjt_ct study, in LifellmJted
time available, the following four sources were found to prnv:lde the most
useful £nformat 1o,_:
• Te_Lixtg performed by the Advallced Development PreJcct_ Orgnniza_:|on
at Lockl_eed-Californla Company in 1956_57(ll).
This very early work at Lockheed's "Skunk Works" included a aeries of!
tests to determine the dotonabiltty of LII2. Although the tests involved only
small quantities of LII2, they were _nformatlve in establishing that LII?would
not detonate, even when solid o_ygo.n was itralersedin the liquid hydrogen,
unless e strong explosive charge was used as at* inlt:later.
In the series of experiments LH 2 contained in a thermos bottle was sub-
61 times, occurred as a result of the
Jected to heavy impact Ignition never
lw_act alone. Nhen a squib or a hot wire was employed to ignite the hydroge,l
vapor following smashing of the thermos bottle by a heavy weight, very little
overpressure was measured, indicating deflagration without detonation. De-
tonetlon occurred in two tests, both in cases where oxygen was de]Iberately
mixed wlth the LH2.
• Spill tests performed by Arthur D. Little, Inc. for the Air Force
in 1958(12) .
This test program was designed to simulate a set of conditions which might be
encountered in storage or transport of largL; quantities of LII2, with the ob-
Jective of establishiqg a basis for realistic quantity-distance relationships
attd safe-handling procedures. The tests included spills of several quantities
of LII2 ranging in size from 5 liters to 5000 gallons to study the magnitude
of the hazards involved. Sp_ll tests of some hydrocarbon fuels were also
made for cofnparlson purposes. Once again it was demonstrated that hydrogen
15
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will sol igult_ from i_ipaet, _ither from hu]JL_t_ helng fired through th_
,_o)ltnitler 01[' f_TOtB tih_ _ont:lJ.lnl_J," h_Jng m_MJ_d, and that, _uUo_ _o.|'tued cm
nt least three sides, it will |lot doyens| o when IW]It:_d,
The eo,l_parimm te_lts wit|) hydrocarbon fuel. dcmozlstratud _he difference
in burning clmracteristicu. Sp£11s of 32 gal,]ouH of each of Lh¢: rue, Is pro_
deced the following result:_:
Fee|_____ Dur_tlon of Fire
LII2 27 seconds
P' Propane, 4 minutes
Gasoline _,5 minutes
JP-4 _:? minutes
Radiation measurements of the hydrogen flatae indicated a maximum emissivity
of 0.005, compared with a value of about 1.0 for the hydrocarbou fuels.
Following are conclusions taken from reference 12 which arc considered
pertinent to the subject study:
I. Detonation effects of a large-scale s|)lll - There was no cvldence
"to substantiate_remise that the mixture of hydrogen and air
formed by the sudden release of liquid hydrogen will detonate when
ignited by a spark.
a. In no spill did the resulting vapor cloud detonate.
b. In all tests (in which an ignition source was provided), the
pressure effects of the resulting fireball wore negligible
except where there was semi-conflnamant of the gases.
c. Transition from deflagration to detonation requires a significant
pressure buildup.
d. Detonation of a perfect stoichiometric mixture of hydrogen and
air took place only when initiated by a etrong detonator.
e. It is probable thor a perfect t, ixture of hydrogen attd air will
not OCCUr.
16
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2, II,,fJ.!Jsrat:h. k ¢_ff_Ftn.gf ]ars_--scal_ ]t21_j.hl--I)_xdrogcm r al¢_m_ _ The
f _.nrdti _l_no¢_Lal:e_d wlth flro occnrrJl_g aTLvr t_l_II_ l lquJd
||_,ldl?o}_tq] v;Iry llv.i._ord.lng to tht_ ]_lllJtll lllld dlnxll:Jlil| 0|: lho ]|illlit_ll,
Jl, ]]o|]/I/gl'll| Jo|l i!f|'l-'¢tll, _ll't! ClJl|tl]di_l'llllJy ]l_tll'l If Ign|l loll l)¢'f!tl|'li
llllltl¢!dl!lloly Ill)Oil llquld r¢!h.!iltll_: Jll|t_ll| I |}'t, bill I llJi:l' hic1"l_lllH'il
i_,|'l'll' ly with d_day_'d Ipult IolI,
b, II] t(ll lltrF_o _qH.llt_ o! hydroHeu, the dnvill]Oll el Lhe l.ivvball
Wollld bl, Ill) J)|'lef (-h/It; lliOlllJ II|FIICIIII't'H would MulI'IW I|O HI}'IIIIJ"
l'Illlt dl|l,1_li',l_i howew, r, COlll]llllll Iblt, lllllLi!l'lilJtl would probilbly l)e
Jl;uJted ntld p_,rHonn_l w:Ithln l.he J:Irehtl]l would bt! s,_vuroly
¢, After di_:._ip:|t::l.otl of the! initial f;[_ebaJ], llam_s would b_ con _
_" fined to u ::eg:l.on d:Lrt!ctly ovur the diked ttt'_!a, but could exLead
150 ft _nte the air.
3. _Lhaz_:d_j!_Lcot_2_ t.._.._.th!)s_ ,'f )_ydro!t.url.,n, - The hazards
at*socl/It_d with vile han,ll.itlg i|nd _ltorage of liquid hydrtlgeu tire ]¢!.a
than |'hose encountered with pol:roI.euv_ fuels,
a. Liquid hydrogen evaporates much more rflp._dly. (Nhe.llu flonle Wits
present, a pool of hydrogcu vaporized in 1/20 to 1/50 tile time
required to evaportlte tl g_tflolitle or proptln t" pool of equal depth.)
b. The flame from combustion of liquid hydrogea t'adiatcs less than
1/10 the energy per unit flame srsa emitted by the hydrw:arbon
fuels (emissivity of the hydrogma<O.1; emissivity of a hydro-
carbon '_i) .
c. The high evaporation rate aud low heat transfer from flame to
liquid pool make the probability of boil-over (i.e., the super-
heating of a large mass of liquid until a sudden flashing to
vapor by a sizable portion of the mass occurs) ir_robable with
liquid hydrogen.
4. ._ffeets of storage-tank rupture - In cases where rupture of a storage
tank is caused by a pressure buildup in excess of the capacity ef
the pressure-relieving device, a fire _ay be caused by the tearing
of the metal st the time of rupture.
• Spill tests of Lll2 performed by NASA at _hite Sands Test Facility,
New Mexico, durinli 1980(13) •
These consisted of seven spills, six approximately 5.7 m3 (1500 gallons) of
Lll 2, the seventh was about 2.7 m_. No ignition was planned arid ache occurred,
The objectives were to determine tile time required for evaporation of the LII 2
and to study the path of the gaseous hydrogen as it dissipated in the
17
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I
aLIiio_qdi._re. }?I_liliul.tl_iry dat_|, _lq111]._mmH_d by movie nlld _I _ l I ph-l.gi'_qd_fl
l Hhow]II[-' tl|O I)IOV(HI|_-H)_: OI |h_-_ _']oltd of Wii[tH.' v_lptw I.Wtilod iif; th¢' }',,sl_¢'¢JLt¢_ Iivdl'**};¢'Is
dlHt_;Lp_it:vd_ pr.vJdod a bI._:[i_ lot w_l J.dllL J-ti_{ tho IIUith{._llNlt:h2_|l Im_ll[!l of IlOl'll fill
_, _mvut dovol_qwd _or tllI' ¢l|tb,[v[_t ,Ltedy,
i S _;_)Jll tol_tli OI ]lqtlJd I_ltttwltl }UH_ (I,NG) _!olldtwL_.q.[ _y J.IIWIoIW_' I,i'.,rl'ltimv
i N.tJluml l,lth_'l t_l'y Iol: I)tqHirllilOtl( ol Em,rl:y .t (',hltla I,.kv(l/0).
I,awr_llc,,! I,JN{!rBIOI'O NlttJ,otlltl ].tlbt_rlttory (I,].NI,) Ill C'Olld_lt'l, ltl H lill t,_l_,ll_lvt,
¢
i s_ri_t of sp:l]l tost:t_ wit:It ],NG olldLq" v.onLrllet Lo the ),Iel)III'lltR, IH ,d I_ll_,lgy
[i (1101,'.), q.'lt_ purpo_m of Lhe work ll_ to d_LerulJue expc!rlltl_!t_ttt]ly llow |.NG d]t_J-.
p_. pzites lti t|l¢_ _:l_lltO_4pil_2roe L|nd [:hCII LO rcpr_!s_,]ltL LIIL_ _.)ccurFt!IICL! WJ|.[t _i liter[he"
nlatical mod_l. Ti_e objective is to prnvide l]Ol", w_th the capability of predi('A;,.
ing the hazard to surrouudiog areas itl tile event ]_lr$_.e quot|tJties el ],NG _trt.,
spilled. _Itlee tlatural gas is geooral]y at ]east 85 percettt Iit_thitlte Lilt! I,'e-
sults of LLNLts tout pregrnm were of itttcrc_;t iu determining the vi:]ldity t)]
the atnlOsl}heric disp_rsion computer ntodel created by Johu Muir Iu_;tJtut:u tor
tile subject program.
Two series of LNG spills have been conducted by I,I,NI, at China Lake.
California; an initial series used 5 m3 in •melt spl]], a later series lu.-
volved nln• spills of approximately 28 m 3 (rougldy 7400 pal.) each, The
tendency of the visible cloud associated with vaporized LNC to remain nee-
buoyant fox'extended periods compared to the relatively rapid rise of the,
cloud resulting from a I,ll2 spill as observed in the NASA _xperiments provided
[ confirmation of data calculated by titcsubject atmt>_q_ht)r:[¢dispersiou model.
These four experin_ental programs were helpful it1 providing infer*ha*Joe
which was of use ill carrying out tile evaluatic_is au tllis study, llowt_ver, it
is obvious much more experimental testitlg should be dont_ to provide :*utile*tries-
tJon of the analytical conclusio!l,t pres_.mted ilcrcill. Scot*us 7 of this report
suggests o number of examples,
3.3 Aircraft Deulgn Charaeteri:*tJe:_
During previous studies for NASA(4), Lockheed establlshed preferred th_-
signs ef aircraft fueled with Ll{2_ LClld_ and ,Jet A, re,,qtectJvel.y,for a series
18
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IIOYVI_ _III:I_Ill,_l_l,tl|{)I:l)li!l_l;llli|iI"].I:i,ll_i_iil;il_' l|llll;ll':Itl_llill I.II_,(ll;l_tll-_lll#i lly,
"1-'h_llli[_ll_;halll:l -_]_cl-_d'ailtll:_.il!ill'l"_Iil1()p_IiIi,,,lll_i,rri,p],itlillil,l'_i_llilli,l'ii17_ii,ii
du_;ll_ll l:_ttlf_q I_I 10,190 klu (5500 ll.lu]o), III el IiOliiiiiiii l!rllllll, nl,,_d ,,i M_u'h I}.H'i,
_Olllla E'llilrlle.t'l_rl_ll:h_ll _|' thl, il_l!l:l!ilJ'l: d_vll_i_,d l_ir iWl{')l i)I I)ii, i_pl,cllJ_d
tUi,_[H l:o il_',(',Olllp',l,ilill l:h:II_ lllJ/lll;JOll I11"I, II|I()WI: h_ L_d_l_ 2, )lql',lllllli' _I lh_' llJlll,i.,.
'J.'AIILE2, - GIIARAC'J.'I_R_g'J.']_C8OF LII2, L¢-'I14,JET A, AND ,IP-6 I"OELEI)SUBSONI.C 'I'RANSPOR'r!;
(_00 Pas_cltB,:!r,10,190 km (5500 It.m:l.),M#_ch 0.85)
LiquidItydrag_n LiquidMethane JutA a_tdJP.4
GroHWelght kg (Ib) 199,740 (372,006) 225,566 (497,3U01 232,060 (511,6901
TotaIFueIWeight k9 (Ib) 21i,606 (56,460) 69,040 (152,2001 64,760 (196,9001
BlockFueIWelght kg (Ib) 21,620 (47,670) 58,686 (130,6361 72,350 (159,5001
OperatlngEmptyWeight k9 (Ib) 103,300 (227,796) 116,170 (256,1201 107,360 (236,7001
WingArea m2 (ft21 286.7 (3,1861 366.6 (4,1441 360.2 (4,093)
Bpao m (ft) 51.6 (170.01 5G.9 (163.11 56.5 (192.61
FuselageLength m (It) 66,7 (216,61 61,4 (201.31 66.0 (197.61
FolelegeDiameter m (It) 6,63 (21,76) 6.10 (26.0) 6,84 (10.11)
Throlt PerEngine N (Ib) 135,000 (36,350) 171,036 (39,800) 165,030 (41,600)
SpecificFuel kg/hr Ib/hr
Coniumptlou(Clolee) _ Ib 6,6206 6.262 0,0604 0,494 0.6616 0.609I
LID (Crolee) .- 17.4 16.21 19,13
TakeoffFieldLength m ft 2440 0066 2436 197-'I 2431 2816
ApproachSpeed m/lee kle 71.0 138 66.6 129 65.3 127
i DatafromReference4
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The geomo£ry and _en,_ralarvangem_nL of th_ thwe nlrcraft du_Jgns are
illtu_trat_d tn figur_ 1, 2, and 3. It w'J]l be noted tlmt Lhe tanks far the
cryogeniually,,fuol¢_d aJrcraf_ are ]oca_¢_d w:lthJn tht_ fuuo]ngt_,one Just aft
of she flight statJon and on_: just forward of tile empennage. An extensive
dctHgn study was mad_ for bo_h the l.ll2 and tile LCll4-fuolcd aircraft to deter-.
mine if other tankage arrangolnc|ltt_ might offer advantage. It wan found tha_
for beuh fuels the fore and aft internal fu'_vlago arrangcmen_ provided th ,_
best arrangement; i.e., lowest direct operating co_t for a prac,:ical design.
Accordingly, the tankage arrangements shown in figures 1 and 2 were adopted
_" for the LII2 and LCI[4 aircraft designs, respectively.
The noncryogenic fuels, v_z., Jet A and JP-4, are conventionally carried
as _nown in figure 3; i.e., with the fuel contained within the wing structural
box.
3.3.1 Fuel s_stcm arrangements
3.3.1.1 Conventional fuel system_.___.- Figure 6 is an illustration of a fuel
system arrangement for a conventionally-fueled modern transport aircraft.
Insofar as possible all fuel system plumbing is carried within the wing struc-
tural box in the same volume in which the fuel is contained. Thus, in event
of a leak in the plumbing no fuel is lost. Also, burying the plumbing within
the tank eliminates concern about damage to that part of the fuel plumbing
system in event of a crash. The portions of the plumbing system inside the
wing box can be damaged only if the tank itself is penatrated, an event of
much more serious consequence. The only portions of the fuel plumbing system
which are vulnerable to primary damage leading to large fuel spills in event
of a survivable crash are those lines and components external to the tanks,
For example, the line leading from the tank to an engine will be sheared off
if the engine pod is torn from the wing.
In a four-engine aircraft the auxiliary power unit (APU) is usually
mounted in the tail section. Accordingly, a fuel line must run from the wing
tank aft through the fuselage, back to where the APU is located. Under normal
2O
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Figure 1. - I,H2 - fueled transport.
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IFigure 2. - Methane-fueled tra_tspor=,
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/Figure 3. - Jet A - fueled trausport.
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circumstances this fuel line oae be |costed we]] within the fuse|age structure
and thus be virtually Jnvu]aerable to serious damage, except in cases where
the fuselage is physics]IF tern apart. For examplu, in the three-engine
Lockheed L-101] aircraft, the rite] llne which runs aft £o tile No. 2 engine
and to the APU, is located Just below the cabin floor and very close to the
vertical centerllue. There is about eight feet of structure below the fuel
line to tileaircraft skin which offccvive]y protects the fuel plumbing in tile
ev,_nt the airplane makes a wheels-up landing.
In addition to being located in the fuselage where the line is physically
protected, since 1967 fuel lines in commercial transport aircraft have been
required by Federal Aircraft Regulation to provide "a reasonable degree of
deformation and stretching without leakage" to accommodate limited amounts of
fuselage separation. Again as an example, Lockheed policy is to make the
fuselage-mounted feel lines capable of stratching to 50 percent of their
original length. Thus, it would require a crash severe enough to separate
sections of the fuselage by several feet Jn order fox" the No. 2 engine/APU
fuel feed llne in the L-1011 to pull apart and spill fuel. The accident data
analyzed and reported in section 3.4 shows the probability of thls happening
in a survivable crash is fairly small.
3.3.1.2 Cryogenic fuel system. - The general arrangement of a fuel system for
a cryogenically-fueled airplane is depicted in figure I. With fuel tanks
located fore and aft in the fuselage it is apparent fuel lines must run be-
tween the tanks and also out to the engines mounted in the wing1_. In this
case, as contrasted with the conventionally-fueled aircraft, even though the
lines running to the engines are located in the wing structural box for maxi-
mum protection against damage, they will be the source of fuel leakage result-
ing from any impact that severs or massively punctures the wing.
The comparison of fuel spillage which might result from wing damage in
a cryogenically fueled airplane versus one fueled conventionally is a matter
of quantity and fuel spill rate. With Jet A or JP-4 fuel, both of which are
stored in the wing, a puncture of the wing box will result in splll of all
the fuel in that tank at a rate which is a function of the size of the hole.
25
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With LH2 or LOll4, the worst theft will happ(_, in _Vl_l_ of WlU;: d_tmagu i_; |:hal
all eltgillufeed lil_u will bu severed. The _mount: of ftL_] spl]It_d as a 1:t,:iu]t
will be contiagenC on whether the boost pump:; and th_ fuel shut.-ofl valve art,
tureed off or not. The rate of spillag_,,wl]] ;l],lllOMucurtalt]]y b_! f;*r |ass
_hau _n tilecase of _he conventional fuels.
Fuel lines for cryogenic fuels will bc insulated to mluimlze ],oat leak.
Without adequate insulatlen, the f_*elwould vaporiz_ oil its way Lo the engine
fuel pump, ultimately causing, the pump to carl|ate, _herehy starvln_, the
engine. Accordingly, the lines will typically be designed as shown ill fig-
ure 5. The llne carryln_ fuel to each engine will be approximately 2.54 cm
(i.0 inch) in diameter for the size aircraft adopted as a basis for this
study. It will he encased in a closed-cell, rigid plastic foam about 3.81 cm
(1.5 inch) thick. In turn, the foam insulation is contained within a thin
aluminum tube 10.16 cm (4 inch) in diameter which serves the dual function of
mechanLcally protecting the foam and preventing air from cryopumping in event
of local failure of the foam. Bellows will he provided aL intervals to ac-
commodate thermal expansion and contraction, plus mechanical vibration and
flexing. Wherever these fuel lines pass through pressurized areas they are
contained in a shroud which is provided with positive air flow. Hydrogen
I (or methane) detectors will be located at the discharge to sense leaks.
For a more complete description of a representative cryogenic fuel sys-
tem see reference 3. There are many more elements to a complete system which
are required to perform the various functions needed on board an aircraft.
These include pressurization, venting, fueling, defue]ing, erossfeed, e_c.
However, for purposes of assessing the crash fire hazard, the engine fuel
supply system just described, represents the principal challenge. Crash
damage to the other systems, with the exception ot crossfeed, will not result
in significant fuel spillage.b
The crossroad system involves the fuel lines which traverse the fuselage
i connecting the tanks so that there are multiple routes by which any engine
can be fed fuel from any tank. They are located ill the fuselag,-'just below
the cabin lower floor as shown in the right side of section AA illfigure I.
These lines are subject to damage in event of a crash in which the fuselage
26
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Figure 5. - LH2 fuel line cross section.
is hro_en. They are the same size as the engine fuel feed lines in the wings
and their severance will result in the same fuel spillage potential.
3.3.1.3 C_/o_enlc canka_e. - Tanks for cryogenic fuel are designed to entirely
different specifications than their counterparts for conventional fuels. Both
LH 2 and LCH 4 are tanked as saturated liquids at a nominal pressure of 145 kPa
(21 psi). The tanks are pressurized with their own vapor product, and so they
contain no air or oxygen. Consequently, there is no fire or explosion hazard
within the tanks, Conventional fuel tanks, on the other hand, are vented to
the atmosphere to minimize differential pressure on the structure, so there
is continually a mix of fuel vapor and air above the surface of the liquid
fuel whlch may he susceptible to ignition. The cryogenic Zuela therefore are
inherently safer in this regard in event of a crash.
Tank pressure in the case. of the cryogenic fuels is controlled by venting
to relieve excess pressure when heat buildup is too greaL, and by intentionally
27
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vaporizing liquid fa_:l w|mn tank [*r_t;mlF_ eb'npn he-low a specified limit. TI|_' 4
_:vy_fi_-_nlc ta_ks are d_l_n_,d tc_ an ult im_ttt, pro_su_ of 908 kP_ (30.2 psi).
FOF COllll)/It'tHon, |he, p/ltl_Ollgor :_lll)ill JH det_igned Lo nu ultllllage prt_ssur¢ of
ouly 124 kPn (]fl lie;i). It In much mort, likely, thereforu_ t;Imt the fuel t,ank_;
would survJvt, _l'_ttlCL Ill t'VellL Of a t:ranh, rather thdn the rust of _ll_ i?usol_ge.
The fuuvlnge would tend to break _u its weakest part_.
Another anp_c,t of the tankage of the cryogenic fuels which results in
their being less likely to suffer damage in event of a survivable crash, com-
pared _o cunvanrional fuels, is their location in tile fuselage. The tank di-
mension (its width) which is vulnerable in a collision with an obstacle on tile
_round in significantly less tar the fuselage-mounted tanks than for wing tanks.
As an oxaa_ple, in the Ltt2-fuelod aircraft shown in figure 1, the fuselage tank
has a width of 6.63 m (21.75 ft). Tile Jet A-fueled aircraft designed for the
same mission, illustrated in figure 3, has a wing span of 58.5 m (192 ft),
most of which contains fuel and is vulnerable to damage from impact which
could cause fuol spillage. In _he Lit 2 aircraft, of course, the wings are
devoid of fuel except for the engine supply lines which, as explained in
section 3.3.1.2, are contained in the structural box between the front and
rear spars and are downstream of shut-off valves controlled from the flight
etatlen.
An additional factor in this regard is the consideration that the fuselage-
mounted tanks of the cryogenic fuels have a significant amount of structure
both ahead of and beneath them to absorb impact loads. ExaminWion of fig-
ures 1 and 2 shows that the nose structure of both of these aircraft would
have to be crushed before a frontal collision would impact the forward tank.
Also, the underside of the tanks in both aircraft is protected, by a minimum
of 45.7 cm (18 ill.) for the forward tank and 35.5 cm (14 in.) fur tile rear
tank, with specially designed structure to preserve their integrity Illevent
of nose gear collapse, a wheels-up landing, or a tar] scrape. This protection
si_ould assure a better record 0£ cr_sh survival for cryogenic _uel tanks than
tileconventional fuel wing tanks.
The tanks for both LII2 end LC|I4 are insulated to minimize heat leak
which would cause rapid boJloff of the fuel. Two types of insulation which
28
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Imvu been fnund t_ be me.t pr_mlt_ing _a _ _esult uf d_L_ll.ed _1_,,]ynis(3)
l arP. ll!uatratud lu tiRnrt_tl 6 imd 7 ll_ dl_t_l_ncd fl_r tim Lll2-llut_.led at.rcrM!t.
'L'hest! lllgt**.LatloH N_Ht_lllll ;*re t rt_spt,c_:i.voly, rigid e]OH/,d,-t_t!]] f/Hilt* t slid
IllieE e_l)heretl,i
on of mie;lmlzJIW, d;lr¢,a'! opt,rat .[H}_
lloth dealgslti wt_re (_Htabl J H|[ed the
i ¢:ost for _he o_rct+aft |ly ticlectllltl an I)pt_.lllUlll COlllprom:l_¢_ hetwt!ell itlHnlatloll
system wctghl: and cost of tuu]. allowed vo boil off. The rigtd closed-cull
foam dutJign mn_t be thicker than the mierosphcru tlystum because tile evacuatedt
m:lcrospht_re ;i**tlu]us J.s H illeJrt _ efficient insulator, llowuvcr, th¢_ microsplmre
system wuishs a little i,o_c and requires an active pumpint_ system, au extra
i complication not rcquiretl by _hc l:aasivu £'oam system.
NASA has carried out extensive preliminary toots of many candidate foam
insul.ations 28. Some, such as Stepan Foam and a (;eueral Electric polyurethane
f composition, have been shown to be very efficient for tile cryogenic applica-
tion. The potential life of these materiels has yet to be explored, however.
[
As shown ill figurt: 6 the rigid closed-cull foam is applied directly to
! the outer surface of the tank, Over that is ._aid a vapor battier such aa
a 0. 127 mm (0.005 in.) thick composite sandwich of mylar-aluminum-aluminum-
mylar-fabric mesh (MAAMF), the purpose of which is to prevent cryopumplng of
air into tlle foam during its operational llfe, and also to prevent the same
occurrence ill the event tilefo'_m develops a crack or other defect.
A flexible open-cell foam layer is applied over =he MAAMF _o p_ovide ai
sprlng-llke cushion between the rigid foam and the Kevlar-syntactlc foam pane]
which serves as tileouter surface of the aircraft in the area of the cryogenic
fuel tanks. A second _MAMF layer is applied between tile flexible foals cushion
and the Kevlar panel to provide a sealed annulus occupied by the cushion which
is purged with nitrogen.
The microsphuru insulation system is illustrated ie £iguru 7. Micro-
spheres are tlny hollow spheres of burosilicutc glass. They are contained ill
all evacuated auoulus surroundin_ the taHk which is formed by a 0.127 mm
(0.005 in.) thl,k stainless steel (CRES) outer shell. The annulus is
29
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Kevlar-wntaetlc_ /Vapor barrier
foamsandwich_ _(MAAMF) jAircraft skin
° "--_exlbieioi'zen.cellfoam -- -4
Vacuumjacket\ ..... ,:?i :m............
.miiCRES _ _ _
I_ )Spheres
evacuatedto (p = 0.0019 PSi (0.1 TOFlli) ',
o'_ _ Tank wail
, _ $trinlior
Figure 7. - Evacuated microsphere tank insulation ay.tem.
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malutainod a_ a s_ft vacuum of .pprux:huat,_ly 13.3 Pa (0.1 Torr). The munn
flexible eu_d;lou formed by op{.m_c{_11 foam pltr_._d w:l._ll nitrogen Jtl used te
nupporl: rile Kevlar a'l.reraft: sk:ln. Tll_a fnm,lat::hm syalom _lu 27.9 mm (1.! 'In.)
I_llinnev than th¢_ c'lns_d-oell foam de_dgu and st:Ill r{;snlt_ In leas fuel bo_Ioff.
llowcvt._r, it. would be a mc_r_ expl_tUllv{_ _ystelu. E_p{+l:im{.Ita] te_tlng slid d{_-
vo.lopllS_at el botll _,yut_ms lisa beetl rt2cOliml_nd_d to explore tits lU)l:t_utlltJ lldVltll.-
Cages ,tad shortcom£ugs of _tlch.
The volumes forward and aft of each tank ill the aircraft (see fivur_a 1
and 2) are intended to be actively fluslmd with air whenever hydrogen (or
methane) sensors located ill the space detect leaked fuel. Ill flight tile air
purge can be provided by opening ven_s and using ram air. On tile 8round tile
positive air flow cat', be providc.d by blower_ installed for ehe purpose.
A unique potential problem posed by tlle location of tile tacks for tile
cryogenic fuels in tile fuselage is tileqeestlon lilac surviving passengers and
crew could be faced with tile hazard of exposure to tile fuel itself. Very
brief contact with LIt2 produces the effect of a burn on Iluman skill. Exposure
of large areas of the body to cryogenic temperatures for even brief periods,
of course, would be fatal.
It is always possible to postulate circumstances Jn which large quantities
of fuel are spilled and soma of it drains into the passenger compartment.
However, illview of tiledesign of the tank and its installation it is con-
eldered highly improbable that there would be a survivable crash where this
would happen. To illustrate, two pressure bulkheads separate tllefuel from
tlle passengers. As previously pointed out, the cryogenic fuel tanks are de-
signed as pressure vessels to an operating pressure of (21 psle). Aeether
pressure bulkhead forms ttle ends of tile passenger compartment adjacent to
both tile forward aud tile aft fuel tanks. Both tile end of tile fuel tank and
tlle adjacent bulkhead leadin 8 to tile passeeger compartmellt would Ii_ve to be
ruptured to permit direct access of fuel to the passengers. To explore this
eventuality an experlmeutal program has been suggested (see beetles 7, Recom-
mandatlons _or Future Work) whlch would involve creel|e, of suitably modified
surplus aircraft.
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3.3.2 ;'aaeen}:_r cabiu wall _tr.uc.Larq, _- One at Lha Impo¢'taut. ta;_ku of LhJ.¢;
_tudy W_i_ I:o _valeata the r_lative haza_-'d of pllm_vllgel:t_ iuuida the ¢:abit_ w|]_n
the autald_ _t[ tll_ I!u'aeJaLO 1_ oal)o_md to _t1:¢_ [170111 spilled _uel, To
eVttluat_ Llll_ haga_'d _r is |lt.'¢c_"ug_ry I_U ktluw t|le ;'.i_)?Ut_UlT;t] d_ul}_n O[ a
typimfl..e_tleu of the fusal,a_u slid the u_atu_ial, involved ill i_' "uust_uctl-on
_u Llle the_lmll proport'l¢_ll t!an be dC,'_L'illlliL_,d,
Vl_:w A-A of figure 8 tu a t'cpr_s_ntattv¢_ pictu_'c of how the sld,_wall of
a li|odt_ru pnti_calgc_r trtinspor_ ifi cotlutructud. '_he Lockheed L-lOll dculgu i_
usud as illustration. Iu the auction wh_'e gila willduwu are located the
aircraft _kia is reinforced with a doubler. Frames are located 20 inches ou
_'* cuntur. Abovu and bulo_ _hi, _£ndew belt is a ,-'aeries where fail-safe straps
of tltattlum ar¢_ employed to reinforce tile aluminum skit*. A cross sectiotl
through the wall in th£. area of tile fuselage is illustrated in figure 9 with
umterial ¢allouts noted.
The aircraft skin is clad 2024-T3 aluminum of 2.29 mm (0.09 inch) thick-
ness. A layer of AA fiberglass insulation 57.2 tm (2.25 in.) thick is retained
about 12.7 mm (0.5 in.) from the inside surface of tile skin. lu turn, apacud
about 9.5 m_ (3/8 in.) from the inside surface of the fiberglass insulation is
a honeycomb panel which serves as the interior wall of the cabin. The honey-
comb panel consists of a core of crushed nomex with surface sheets of hard
fiberglass on both sides. The total thickness of the honeycomb panel is
3.18 ram (0.125 in.).
A _ec_'iou showiug the construction of a window is presented in figure i0.
The 825 cm 2 (128 in 2) clear area consists of three panels, tho outer two
being structural members, tlm ilnlermost being simply a protactive layer to
prevent scratching of the more critical panes. It also serves a function of
permitting circulatieu of warm dry air to prevent fogging.
The thcrllml characteristics of the cabin wall sectiou are presented in
section 5,5, alotlg with all analysis of heat transfer through the wall as a
fuactlon of time as a result of uxposur_ to various fire conditions.
32
00000001-TSC13
00000001-TSC14
/ • • ,_ ",_ i_. _..%
J
I%1
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d'
Figure i0.- L-1011 cabin wiudow assembly,
3.4 Aircraft Accident R_cords
The sources of accident data used An this review were:
a. National Trausportation Safety Board (NTSB)
b. Internatlon.l Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)
c. World Airlit_ Accidmlt Sumumry - Civi] AvL, i_,, Autilority (CAA)
d. Lockheed Company Accident File_
u. Miscellauuous lleports, Art.Lcles,
T[tu NT.qB records, partleulaL'ly accident t_Ulliltl;Irl.ull(references 15 aud ]0)
fur the years 1964-1977, wcru the pr]m, ry source of Ini[urulat.LotLfor euml)i]in};
sCatistiCs. Tile or;her data sources) us well as more cur_._nt accidct}t reports)
w_re used to au_nent the N'I'SB records. A coml)l_:te uva]uatioe of the aec.:Ldent
data ks provided in reference 17.
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'£ablo 3 provides _ au.mlary of 783 NT_I_ aeeidcnr:; £er _he porlod 1964-1.977
at_ fuuctions 0£ h_Jtn.'y lade× and ept_ratiomtl mod_. Thl_'; total was reduced to
341 slate tt_my ef _h+_ aceld,;_ata were not po.rtiuuuK |lot Lht_ pttrp_o.+_ .I Llti_i
*_tudy. Those accidont'a olimitmLed from further considvratiou were:
• Small aircraft (TOGW _ 5670 kg (12,500 lb))
e Not_design-related items (turbulouco, hail, sabotage)
• Improper safety practices (unfastcued seat belt, passenger/attuudant
aisle injuries)
• Unrealistic impact conditions (in-air aircraft colllsons, collision
_ with on-ground personnel)
• Miscellaneous accldeuts (inadvertent door opening, static operations).
The reduced number of accidents is sho_al in table 4. They consist of
accidents due to:
• Controlled and uncontrolled collisions with ground/water
• Undershoot
• Stall
• Hard landing
• Wheels up, retracted gear, gear collapse
• Overshoot
• Swerve
• Obstacle impact or coll_slon.
Figure Ii shows a comparison of the number of occurrences of fatal,
serious injury and minor/non-injurious accidents for tileoriginal 783 data
set and the reduced 341 accident data set. As cat*be noted in figure ii,
both sets of data are consistent with each other iu that both show uncontrollud
aud cotttrolled collisions wit[',ground resulting I,ia subatatttial nul_iberof
fatal and serious i:*Jury accidents; while stalls, over_thoots, u_dershoots and
accidents involving obstacles result ill a moderate number of fatal and serious
35
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'£AI',JJ.: 3. 5UI'/1,_RY OF AC:_li)EN'J.' TYPI.J_ BY OPERATIONAL blOl)l_
1904.77NrSf Deta
Takeoff Lending Taxi Fliuht Static Other Totals
Primary ccidentTvpe |X Y Z X Y Z X Y Z X Y Z{X Y Z X Y Z (T) X Y 2_,
1I Severelmpect (96) 64 12 30
A. Controlledcolli:ion l 2 O 0 !5 _ 1 9 1 0 (32) 20 5 1
O. OncontraiiadCollisian2 1 1 7 1 0 11 0 0 (23) 20 2 1
C. rsheet 4 2 20 (26) 4 2 20
93 Stall 1 2 S 2 1 0 1 0 0 (16) 4 3 6
mF I1. Moderate.HighSinkSpeed (176) 9 15 152
_ A, lending 2 1 27 (30) 2 1 27
n. Collapse 1 1 4 0 2 26 0 0 11 (47) 2 6 40
C. Wheelsup 0 0 1 0 1 18 (20) 0 1 19
O. RetractedGeer 0 0 3 0 0 11 0 0 2 (16) 0 0 10
E, Swerve 1 1 7 0 0 26 0 1 2 (37) 1 2 34
F, Overshoot 4 6 16 (26) 4 6 16
II1. SystemMalfunatton (131) 20 40 171
A. Eng _Melfunation 1 9 11 0 4 3 0 1 0 2 3 20 (54) 3 17 34
B. Prop/ratermallunction2 0 2 1 0 1 0 1 0 3 0 (21) 10 7 4
C. Airfremefeilure 0 5 1 0 0 3 0 0 3 4 0 (21) 4 6 12
D. Fire/explosion 0 2 2 0 1 4 0 3 3 3 0 (36) 3 I1 21
IV, C With (95) 30 9 66
A. Tree 5 0 3 1 0 (10) 6 0 4
B. Oitchas,fence,seow_l 1 3 1 1 0 Q (6) 2 3 1
C. APl lights,wires 0 1 3 0 2 4 0 0 (10) 0 3 7
D. zclea(bldg.,eute) 1 0 3 1 0 9 0 0 9 0 0 (26) 2 0 24
E. People 2 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 (6) 6 1 0
F. eft 2 0 0 0 1 0 3 0 17 10 I (37) 16 2 20
V. seousunknowna 0 2 5 1 4 8 0 4 1 3 15 1 1 0 (68) 6 44 18
Vl. Turbulenceandmisc.flight t 0 0 4 1 I 203 (217) 2 207 8
occurrences
Totals 17 27 _2 44 36179 4 10 48 46 223 46 7 31 10 1 1 0 121 327 33596 258 62 317 48 2 (7631
X ,, No.of accidentsinvolvinllfatalities
Y = No.ofaccidentsin whichhighestinjuryindexissevereinjury
Z _ No.ofaccidentsinwhicho .y m/ear/noinjuriesweresustained
(T) = Totalno.o1t,e,,idents
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) , vl.
'£AtlLI_ 4. ItEI_U_J,:i.__UlV_4AK¥ OF ACCI3)EN'£ TYPI,_ JtY Ol 61[A_.OHA], H()DE
IIA_EI) t)N lt)_DUr.'l_l)NUMliI'_KOF AC(]I))EN'I' CANDIDA'£);.q
1964-77NTSBDale
Takeoff Landhlg Taxi Flight Totals
PrimaryAccidentType X Y Z Y Z X Y Z X Y Z (T) X Y Z
I. SevereImpact (70) 37 0 24
A. Controlledcollision 2 0 LI 15 4 I 6 1 31 120) 23 4 1
B, Uncontrolledcollision 2 1 1 2 I 0 4 0 0 (11) 0 2 1
C. Undershoot 4 2 18 (14) 4 2 19
D. Stall 0 I 4 2 0 0 (7) 2 1 4
II. Moderate-HighSinkSpeed 1_54) 8 12 134
A. Hardlending 2 1 24 (27) 2 1 24
B, GearCollapse 1 I 4 0 2 23 0 Q 11 (_.2) 1 3 30
C, Wheelsup 0 0 1 0 0 15 (16) 0 0 16
O. Retractedgear 0 0 3 0 0 10 0 0 I 114) 0 0 14
E. Swerve 1 1 6 0 Q 18 0 1 2 (29) 1 2 26
F, Overshoot 4 6 10 120) 4 6 16
Ill. SystemMalfunetion 180) 6 15 5.,._
A. Enginemalfunction 1 0 9 0 2 2 I 1 16 (39) 2 9 27
B. Prop/rotormalfunction 2 0 2 1 0 I 1 0 0 (7) 4 O 3
r[ C. Airframefailure 0 3 1 0 0 3 !00 0 3 1 0 5 (16) 1 3 12D. Fire/explosion 0 I 1 0 1 4 , 1 3 1 0 7 (19) 1 3 15
IV. CollisionWith (37) 10 6 21
A. Trees 5 0 3 1 0 1 (10) 6 0 4
B. Ditches,fence,seawall 1 3 0 1 0 0 (5) 2 3 0
C. App.lights,wires 0 1 2 0 2 4 0 0 1 (10) 0 3 7
D. Obstacles(bldg.,auto) 1 0 1 I 0 2 0 6 0 0 1 (12) 2 0 10
Totols 11 10 35 37 21 144 2 26 15 1 31 63 42 236
64 202 28 (341)
X = No.ofaccidentsinvolvingfatalities
Y -=No,of accidentsh'lwlfi&hhi'Jhesth'_jtiryindexissevereieiury
Z = No.ofaccidentsin whichonlyminor/noinjuriesweresustained
(T} = Tote|No.o1accide_tt.
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60 '- _ CC - Controlledcollisionw/groundFetal UC -- Uncontrolledcollilioo w/groundzmuzum
U_ - Undershoot
E I Seriousinjury HL - Herdlanding
[] WU - Wheelsup
RG Retractedgear
90 Minor/no injury GC - Geercollepr_
OS -- Overshoot
" OBST - Obstacle
Fisu_e II. - _omparieon of NTSB surnma£ies.
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TABLE _. _,COML'ARiSON OF FATAL ACCIDENT PERCENTAGES FOR
i i , l, Jl
NT_B AND WORLDWIDE ACCIDENI SUMMARIEq
i NTSS10G4- 77 NTSB2004- 77 Worldwide(1904.• '19)'
(783Accldente) (341Accidents) (2707Accidents)
i No.Fatal No.Total ' No.i:etal No.Total No.Fetal No.Total
AccldentType Accident=Accidents!%Fetal: Accidents Accidents%Fetal: Accidente Accident=%Fatal:
Controlledcollision 26 32 81.3 23 20 02.1 58 100 50
i U,controllodcollision 20 23 07 0 11 72.7 27 40 67.5
Stall 4 15 263 2 7 28.6 16 33 40.5
_.. Undershoot 4 26 15.4 4 24 16.7 14 37 37.6
Herdlanding 2 30 63 2 27 7.4 2 61 3.9
Wheelsup 0 20 0 0 16 0 0 27 0
Retractedgear 0 16 0 0 14 0 0 57 0
Gearcollapse 2 47 4.3 1 42 2.4 4 152 2.6
Swerve 1 37 2.7 1 29 3.4 8 00 9
Overshoot 4 46 8.7 4 26 15.4 4 75 5.3
Collisionwith obstacle 10 52 19.2 10 37 27 16 51 31.4
"ThroMarch1979
accidents were classified in accordance with the accident types noted in
figures ]0 and 11. The accident types were then classified lute _hree crash
situatluzt categuries. These crash situations are defined below as:
i GGO: Grouud-to-Grouud Overrun Condition (table 6)
AGHL: Air-to-Grouud Hard Landing (table 7)
AGI: Air-to-Ground Impact (table 8)
Thirty-two of the 108 accidents wur_ ¢ousidured as "impact nonsurvivable"
or "wlpe-outs"; that is, everyone onboard perished. Since Scenarios 2 and 3
in the subject study are concerned only with crash fire hazard in otherwise
survivable accidents these 32 accidents were eliminated from further consider-
orlon. In addition, ten mlscellaneous accidents, which Fielded little or no
useful informatlon as to causal data were ellm._nated from the accident files
1-eavlng a total of 66 accidents available for data analysis in the three
selected crash s_tuatlons: GGO, AGNL, AGI.
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tfk L_ ,q_pr.prJaLv ko e._;pl;th= thitt: d;Iffel:eut lttw,_i_l.V,,¢t Jw_ bodJu_= havt_
_i|1c'J;UILL r_J'lltit, JlH,H U[ WhilL ¢:OtIt_L,[ELIL&H_ ;I _ttlTV_Vit_JO _¢CI_L!I_E, '£h_
_itLJ.tql=ll 'J'viCtl_'=l}¢ll'L_iL,l,'_)tl _,tlt-_k)' ,130_ll:d (N'I'_";_) tll.!l.l.ll_;_ ;i H|l|'vJvab,[I._ ¢ll-'L'.J-d_llt
_ (JLIP ltl wh'l(:h Lh_ o_Caltiab]o V(.)],UI[LL_ i_ (_(.)n_l'le_:od f_nJ'J,'lc:l{.!ll{.1)' itll.=lCI. J'L)lJUW _
Jll_ a _l:l),_h Lo [llLve [)l:Ov_,dt),d l_3:o[_{3(2t_,on lee L]I{.! Oi2CU|'_tLILt3 klild I'[l_ 'lo_ld_ al.'{,!
d_oln_,d to have bv_[ wi_hlt% tolerabl_ lill_It_, 'l'huu, by N'£_B ru_ea_ avcldm_ts
which _utn_ l)_ul)lc_ t_urv_w_ l_'t, selaetitllt.'u cali_go_.'iz_c| _ t]utl-survivabl_ o.nd ¢otl-
ver_ely, at:,'id_tl_s wllit:h ',)reduce |tO _t|rvivor_ a_e aotnetig|oa labeled survivable.
Oa _i_e. o_her hand, _im Feeeral Aviation Au_hority (FAA) employs a _aigh_-
£orward do_inltiou which r_uult_ in a ,'las_i_Icatlon of aurvlvable i£ a_ least
one pe_soll survlve_ a _ras_. ["or the pruse1_t stud_ We are using the FAA
_eflnltlon.
Agail_ as part of tile study d_scr£bed i_'t _'eference 17, the ac¢idet_t data
wan then aasembl-d :In accordal_c_ with the typ_ of airplane engine arraugement
_mp]oye_: wing pylot_-t_uut_te_ et_iue_, aft fu_elage-mou_ted engines, at_d
cutnblt_e_ aft fuselaBe/wit_ g pylot_-ntouuted et_Ittes. The distributiott of aeeldents,
as they relate to these dlfferen_ engln,' Inoun"itlg arrangements, is 8how_z in
table 9. Of tile total of 66 accidents, 30 had an engine mounted in or all tile
rear of the fuselage and r.tlus lind fuel lines _'unnin 8 axially through the
fuselage wbich wore uubject to _anmge frotn fuselage breakage/separation.
TABLE 9. - DISTRIBUTION OF ACCIEENT DATA AS RELATED
TO AIRPLANE ENGINE ARRANGEMENT
CandidateCrashSituation*
668 A@HL AGI
I Engine
! A_'on9omant t_dlnil Takeoff GG2 AG1 A62 A63 AGe, Totett
' A_. r 'elogn 4 2 4 7 2 3 3 25[
i v. S 6 5 3 1 4 I1 36
One/_ft Fuselaou
TwoWindPylon ,_ 2 - 1 1 1 - S
Totals IO 18 9 11 4 8 14 @G
*0alined inTobies6.7, nn'J6
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Tnbi#atl .IU, J] ;llld [2 tlhl,w Lhu fl:l_(jll_!lll!y llJ; eelzulFrc.il_i_, _lf |tie.] ,up.lJhlg_ lu
I-'Ld;tLlt)l[ LI) Lile (ll/(/lll']['l.'|l¢:_ {J| J-tlta-LI;i_,{_ _leliZll_;tLJ.Lq} fijy |:lie d/J;Jet'LqiL _liglli{_
{_lll|| iglll:k!d ;llJ'lililli¢!_i , Ai; (!lit| Di.! IIOtL_rl by L|IL' (I;tLa In Lh_l;u I-/ibJeH lu/;id/ig¢,
li_i_;tl;tlJllll/bl:¢!ilk llI_(:[IJTN ill W_II dulllll-!d hard l)O]ll[.l_il J,(.!, I W.|tl[-% J{!_ldlllg
_dg{' (I,.l'_,), w,lug Ll,llllug _!dg_,' (T,E.), l l)rw;li:d oJ (Jlnl)i!llll_igl_! , iltl(I Ill I; i)j
V;tbill, J,IIt, hu ilt:l:hl!JllLil ,hlvi)ivlil_ Llil._ 30 iiJt'141"lll_l., W.[I.h ill l..'-IllllLlll!.,ed (-_lll_,;l.lll,/fl
llllly lilllA llllil-dllei.l ill' I llfll!.lill;I-' i'il/lllil'_lLi.llll wIIH I1oi.lli1 lib ;1 |ii)l$11J.b]l._ C;lll_ll,, iii
I I,iu.I. _ipll I .
T_lbl.es +1'I ;illd J,4 li]l()w Lllu r,_]al.ivu flru hazaL'd _llld sLruc!_ur.,ll _i)'_il.l.,lll
dill'lagu ,LllvUlvi,_lllellL fur all I.liu ali.'cr;lft aa a [UlleLlOll ut tliuir uiitllle arranl_u-
I" illi_i'.t, 01[ il Lt)l_ill el 'ill) ,IcIzidl2tlt_ illvulving Llirli]illle_; wtlAh Willtl liyl.Oll-lnlJulll;c_d
etlliillus, 24 ;.ittl,,:ll/i.;llL_ _lluw l;trc,, oltCul£reliue,,i ur IA|ie i)ol,.etitia.]. Of O. fire hazard
lt:l.ill i. ill.'l ,upl.l]agU. Wlu[ l [t1¢1. Ittlllk l'Ulll_tlrl! .l_currud as t.liu _l:ated uause in 10
ell i:llu24 fIL'u hazard tlu_:IdUlll:Slfollowed by 8 oc(/urrullces of wing fuel lille
suve,'uuue. Niucc.llanuuus or -usl;aLud causes acuuuilL for 6 fare hazard
accid_llts. Guilera.[]y tile Inisrellailuous ,'ausu _S associated with a Willl_ root
,ki_liil_.;iL,[i)li 0£ W;[II_ t,dIl|', EUI)LUI._,
TABLE I0. - RELATIONSlIIi_ BETWFEN FUSELAGE BREAK AND FUEL _PII.L OGCUHRENCE
- GGO CI_ II SITUAT}iUN -
Numberof Occurrenceof Fuel
Eiluinu Accidelits Occurrenceof Fuselage SpillandNo Fuselage Occurrenceof Fuselage
Arranuemu.t Involved Breakand FuelSpill Break BreakendNo FuelSpill
--L
Aft,uselale , f,"
Whig/pylon 9 1 _li) 1 _ 4 2 ,1 1 'i
O.e aft fuselage/ 2 -- 2
|We wing pylon
0_ Breakoccurredat wl. ULE.
_2_ Breaksoccurredatwing L,E. a.d T.E.
(3J Breakoccurredfoiwar:' of empennage,fuel spilloccurredfronl winUfuel tank,
_4_ Breaksoccurredat whig L.E. alid T,E., fuelspilloccurredat whigroot,
C.5_ Breakoccurredforwardof e.tpennoge.
_.._ Breaksoccurredat wing L.E. aild T,E,, fuel spill from wi,g fuel tankor enginefuelline.
Q Breaksoccurredut wPl9 LE. a.d T.E., fuel spill fronl wingfuel tank,
(_ Breakoccurredot wing LE,, fuel spillfrom wing fuel tank.
_'_ Breakoccurredatwing LE., ullknow, leeksource.
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TABLE 11. - RIIAIIL)N_IIIIBETWEEN I,USELAGI_ III(EAKAND I,UEI,S£1LL OCCUI{RENCF
- At;IlL CItASllSITUATION -
I Numberof Occurrenceof I:eol
Engine Accido.ts Occorre.¢aofFosulouo SpillqndNoFuselaHo Occ.rrueco!I_osa|agu
Arronuomant .... hlvolv._ed. HreokandFuelSpill ...... ._Or_ek bronknedNoF,el Spill
m Aftfuselage _ 1® f 1(I) 1(2)_(3)
Wi.g/pylon 2 - 1 1 (3_
Oneoft fuselage/ 1 - 1 -mk
twowingpylon
at
" (_ Breakoccurredforwardofempennage,
(_ Bl'eaksoccurredaftof cabinandforwardof empennage,®
BreakoccurredotwingT,E.4_ Breakoccurredforwardofempennage,foilspilloccurredotwinDroot.
I
TABLE 12. - RELAEION_HIP _E'£WEEN FUSELAGE BREAK AND FUEL SPILL OCUUI_.REN_E
- AGI CRA_ql[SITUATION -
Nil
Numberof Occurrenceof Fuel
Engine Accidents Occurrenceof Fuselage SpillandNoFuselaue Occurrenceof FuselageArrangement Involved BreakandFuelSpill Brook BrookendNoFuelSpill
I Aft usol.o 8 I 4C2)i® 2
Wing/pylon 16 1@ 1® 120) 2
Oneaft fuselauo/ 2 1 (2._1@
twowingpylon
i
_1_ Brooksoccurredaft ofcabinendotwingL,E,andT.E,,fuelspilldueto enginelineor fuselageseparotion.
Fuselagedestroyedorbrokeupintoseveralsectionsandfuelspillattributedtow t9tookrultore
(_) Breakupoccurredforwcrdof empennage,f elspillunknown,couldbefueltookorfuellinerupture,
_. BreakupoccurredforwardofwingLE,, fuelspi_lfromwingtank.Oreokupoccurredfor ardofompefmoge,fuoispillduoto engineseparation,
_) BreakupoccurredotwingT,E,,fuelspilldueto engineseparation.
_'f) Aircraftweredestroyedin4 accidents,breakupoccurredeftof cabin3 times,forwardof empuzmage2 tin_os,
aftof cabinandforwardofempennage2timesandatwingL.E,once.All spillsoreassociatedwithfeeltank
rupture,engineseparation°orwingseparationexceptin2caseswherespillagecauseisunknown.
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'I'AI_IJ_[J... l,')l{l':IIA/.AL{I}SLI_J_|_¥,AIJ,AJ|{l']_li_CI3NJ_']('UI_TI{)N_
m. ...................
.............. C_id!dateCraeh_Itoat_,s'
--_-- _---- A_ I _ r _ _4 _'"_
NumberofAccldon. 2O S 11 4 _ 14 UU
FIREHAZAAL]
TotalNo_b_rFIr.zQcco.ad S _ 5 4 '1 11 4
FuelCant#Jill|ionS,Strut.Related U Ii 3 4 5 O 31
(FuelSplil)
Frlctlolt,Orouild,ttydraulicLine 2 1(,S) 3
Related
U_s_a_ad I t Oe) 2(G) 3(o)I
FuaISpllI,NoFire 2 I 1 1 3 7
TotalNumberof Firesend 10 7 5 4 6 14 48
PotentialFires
ESTIMATEDCONTRIBUTIONSTO
FIRE HAZARDS_)
e WingFuelLineSevered
a. Engine/PylonSeparation 2 2 4
b. WhigRoot/InboardFailure 3 _4}{9"_ I (4_9) 4 (9;} 8
c, Wi,IUOutbuat'dFailure 1_Q_ 1
d. L.O.Penetration O
e, WingL,E, O
f. MIseeUeneous 1 (9) 1
e FuselageFuelLineSevered
e. FnseloGeS paration 1_.4_ I
_.EngineS p.,aOo. _(_) _(4_ 20_ 4
¢. LandingGeorPelietretion 1_5_ 1
e WingFuelTankRupture --.
a. L.G,CoBapse/Pel',etratlol_ 3 3
b, Colunntorhllpest_.1_ 1 3 1 2 7
t c, Coatourhupact_'2-..._ 2 3 5
d, Fronta|Obstwuutien_ 1 2 3
e, L.6. CollapseandFus,Impact O
f, L,G,TrunnlonAttocltFIttl.g ! 1
• Ilefi_ledh_TablesS,7, endB (..6')05stucteshwoived,wi(r9separationor.curred
"1{._Pole,Tree,Pier,Light (._.)Fuelcontainmentrelatedfiresandspills
Ditch,Racine,Hilt.Embankment _) NoseGearcollapse,severedhydraviicline
Fence,Building,Wall {,8} Possiblefueltankrupture
h'lcluoespasIibi_itVofeithasor bothouuurrenae_on _O_WingRootAteu
anteaccident
(_ FuselaGeLine/souRerdesiv_edseeresultOfa_.cidentIn 1965
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'I_ABLE14. - _'_R_C'£U_{ALDAMAGE BHI,LMAR¥, ALL AIRPLANE CON),,'IGt_RATION,B
C_i)dHmtaCralhSitumtiuns*
_OlllblirofAccldalltl 20 B 11 l] 14 (_6
I:uielaueBreak/Separation
a, Aft of CockpitI:wd,f"uiollgo 3 3
b, Wlull,LendingEdge(L,E.) ') 1 1 4
c, Wing,TrillingEdge('r.E.) _ 1 1 4
d, Forwarduf Empeu,eBe 1 I 2 1 3 6
u, Wing,[,E. endT,E. 2 3 I 6
f, Aft of CockpitandFwd, 2 2
of Eml_e_l,_Igl
g, Thru(_.-__',orOraoks 2 2 1 5
.Eu_ineSeparation
FuselageMountedConfiguration 2 2 3 2 1 2 12
WiugMountedCoutigurotiou 6 1 i. 1 4 6 20
FuselagenodWingMounted 2 1 1 1 5
Root.lnbeerd 2 3 2 3 11 21
Outboard-Tip 2 3 2 1 1 9
Miscelleneous/Unknown 2 1 I 2 6
LendinQGearCollapse
MLGCollapseOnly 4 2 6 3 15
NLGCoBepseOnly 5 1 I 7
MLGendNLGCollapse 7 3 I 3 S 3 20
Occurreucesof:
FloorBuckling 1 3 4 3 1 3 15
CockpitCrushing 1 I 1 5 B
LowerFusela0eCrushing/Abrasion 5 3 4 2 2 18
OverlzeadRocks!PanelFAilures 3 4 3 1 11
Jammedend/orDeformedDoors 5 3 1 I 3 13
SlideRelatedFailure 3 I 2 6
GalleyEquipmentFeBures I 1
T._/WheelOamagn 5 1 6
*Oefinedin Tables6, 7, and8
**Numbersin tableindicatenumberofecetdautsinwhichstatedeveutsoccurred
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.15_rt'Id_IIL_Idlow |!Ireo_'4_rr_llC_,c_" flre poteatJal from ;_fuel _p]]l. hl
LIIei_uI_ |II:_.,h_ixard at'.cJdi_iiLtl,41:t,.JliiH¢lJa_,bi:piik.-tlpo_cLu:l:L:d12 _iIile_,
Ih_w_v_I:,In oIIJ._(Jlluof Lh_'Au ].2 _.IINLIIII_OIIi_ iI fluted LIIaL t||_4|-ni_eJa_i
s_p.ratlonlhrlmk maX have led to tlle fuel splll. Again wing fuel tank ruptur_
is a prevalent eecurre*_co (8); fol]ow¢_d by fuselage fuel liu_ sevurenee,
usually eugine sepa_ati_n_ (4), and wing fuel lille severance, partlcular]y at
th_ root (3).
The explanation of the caes_ of fuel leakage u_' flr_ I_ oft tilnc_
unclear in tilea,:cldeut cupurt._. For example, iu table 13 iL is reported tha_
it, st:yen Instances _he cause of fire was uastated ill the NTSB reports. Since
spu,'ific causes uf fires which were not related _o fuel spills are identified
(three cases) it Call be presumed thaL the seveu unstated cases involve furl
spills but that the source of the spill was in question. On the basis of this
conjecture, it wuuld be valid to conclude _hat 82 percent of tiletime fuel
e_
is spilled, fire rosul_s. On the other hand, if the sava_ unstated causes of
fires are divided in tilesame ratio as the number of fires known to be due
to fuel spills (31) to fires known to be due to nonfusl causes (3), then
only 6.3 of the seven unstated fires would be due to fuel spills and the
above percentage would drop to 81.2 percent. I= therefore seems appropriate
to conclude that in more than 80 percent of the time when fuel is spilled
in an aircraft crash, fire results when the fuel is Jet A. Further, since
all the other fuels being conslderod in ti*is study will ignite at least as
readily as Jet A, ti*estatement could be expanded by saying it would be true
regardl_ss of tile fuel.
Tabl_ 15 summarizes the fuel containmuut related fire potential and
structural system damage data. Fuselage break, engine separation, wing
failure, and landing gear eellopse occurrences, in terms of relative frequency,
ar_ similar for wing pylon or aft fuselage engine-mounted eonflgL_ratious.
While some percentages differ for tile two difforcl_t coafiguratioau, they a:e
generally within -+i0percent of tile total of all 66 accidents.
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,-,_c',_-tS
l.'z_,l_JJ_].5, _ L;[J._b\L{YLIJ,' ]"UL,L L;I).".;.L_\J._iI,_.Ltl",_',\l',.), _\_;IJ ,_J.l{Ut.ll,|<.\l, ]JA.',l_,t.|';
JU,_,r_.Llt)_(Ij, " ' ......... '_.....
EngineArrangement
WingPyfun Aft Fuselage All
Nun_bcrofAccidents 36 25 66
,a,o,o,...... • .........................15,do, 38
-. WingFuelLhmSeverance_ O(22,2) 3 (12) 14 (21.2)
FuselageFuelLineSeverence -- 4 (16)_3_) 5 (7,G)
WingFuelTankRupture(-.2_ 10(27.8) O(32) 21(37,9)
StructuralSystemDamage1_
FuselageBreak/Separation 20 (55,8) 16(64) 39(59.1)
En9ineSeparation 20(55.0) 12(48) 37(55.0) ..
WingFoilures 20(55.6) 11(44) 36(54.5)
Root-Inboard 13(36,1) 5 (20) 21(31.8)
OutboardTip 5 (13.9) 4 (16) 8 (13.6)
Miscellaneous 2 (5.6i 2 (8) 6 (9.1)
LandingOearCollapse 22 (61.1) 15 (60) 42 (13.6)
( ) DenotesFoalContainmentandStructuralDamageDataigtpercentages;basedontotalnumberof accidentsfor
theparticularenginearrangementconfigurationsotedatthetopoftherespectivecolunms.
(_ Morethanonesystemconbedamagedinonaccident,therefore,percentagescantotalmorethan1Q0%.
_2_ Sevenfirepotentialsnotedeewingfuellineseveranceouldalsobewingfueltankruptures.
_3_ Onlyonedllatofuselageseparation,
(..4) Doesnotincludn1fireoccurren"einwhichcontainnmntrelationshipisunclear.
(8._ Doesnotinclude6fireoccurrencesinwhichcontainmentrelationshipisunclear,
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The location of the engines on vhe wing, or on the aft futlelage, does not
significantly alter the accident statistics with regard vo overall, s_rueturo-
participation,
A do*ailed evaluation of the crash conditions postulntefl for tile subject
study indicates that the three crash sftuation,_ and their subsets ((i(:l, (:(12,
AGI, ht;2j AG3, AG4), arc applicable to crash qcenariou 2 and 3 an follows:
_rash scenario No. 2, defined as follows: "h survivable crash landing,
or failed take-off, wheru damage to fuel tanl_tge or if*Ins results it,massive
release of liquid hydrogen after the aircraft has co*no to rosY," would result
in damage similar to crash si.'uatlons GGI and GG2, which are essentially
ground-to-ground accidents accurriu 8 on the runway or as a result of over-
running the runway. The accidents in these scenarios involve airplanes running
off the runway at a speed in the vicinity of 80 k_s and imparting terrain,
or obstacles, at lower speeds; e,g,_ 40 kts. On an average_ th_ airplane
comes to rest within 500 meters past the runway threshold. For these typus
0£ accidents, 14 Of the 29 accidents involve'_ fuel leakage. Wing tank
ruptures account for ii of the 14 spills dlstribu_ed as _ollows:
7 contour, columnar, or frontal impacts.*
4 landing gear penetration
I Two of the 14 spills were associated with wing engine/pylon fuel line breaks
and one of the spills was associated wir.h a fuselage fuel llne break (could
be either a fu elage break or engine separation).
Fuel spill from only one side of the aircraft is characteristic of this
r type accident. Fuselage are generally not severe separation
of breaks and the
usually isn't complete.
r Crash scenario 3, defined as follows: "A survivable crash landing, or1
failed take-off, where damage to fuel tankage or lines results: in massive
I release of liquid hydrugan upon impact and during aircraft deceleration",
would produce damage similar to AGI, AG2, AG3 and AG4 crash situations. The
*3 of these spills could be wing root/inboard failures.
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,li];_Lo_grt_l|zld nc.c].(iellL_ In t|lo.s¢ -_51to;ilion5 i|wo]v¢2 high f¢_rwnrd nlld sink
sp{_d;;, A iorw;ird _[}eed of at: ]east 120 kt._wns n,'._ulnt_dfor tll¢_l}Url}osoof
{_klllinL_ng crt_dible dnttlage. ].e;ldtng to fuel '_,l,.l..I.age rnres nnd qunntitit:s.
A(;I nml A(;2n,.:cldenusoc¢:ur Illth_ prox_mJ.ty of ghe airport, while AG3
and AG4 _u'.¢:Ident;_ uft._._Ime_ occur _ubs_n_tlnl (li_H:nnees from alrports and ill
ho_;Lile su_'roundings. Fur _hc:se type_ of crashes, 24 of the 37 a_:idcnts
involved fuel leakage. Wing fuel tank ruptures accoul_ted for 18 spills. In
the majority of tile accident's, columnar (tree), contour (embankment, hill)
and froLltal (ho-_e) impacts caused failure of the wing either inboard at the
wing root or outboard of the nacelle. Fuel llne leakage occurred in two
instances duo to wiug engine pylon separation, two instances of fuselage
engine pylon separation, and two instances involving rupture of a llne in
the wlug leading edge.
Fuel spillage from both sides of the aircraft is characteristic of this
type of accideut due to the density of obstacles in the crash environment.
Tlm sovorlty of the crash conditions for this situation is such that complete
separation of fuselage sections ell break-up can be expected.
Ill summary, in the accidents studied it was found that although fuselage
breakage/separation occurred Just as frequently as did wing damage, the fuse-
lage damage did not usually result in fuel spillage, whereas wing damage did.
Further, in the case of cryogenic fuels, it must be recognized that they will
be contained in tanks designed to an ultimate pressure significantly greater
(30.2 psi vs. 18 psi) than that of tile rest of the fuselage in which they are
mounted. Thereforej it can be concluded that the fuselage-mounted tanks of
the cryogenic fuels will be more likely to survive a crash than the rest of the
fuselage, i.e., breakage will occur in the weaker sections. This should lead
to markedly better survival statistics for the cryogenic fuels. Fuel spillage
will occur, generally, only if fuselage sections separate so far that lines
are pulled apart. Engine separation from the aircraft, whether wing or
fuselage-mounted, will be the principal source of fuel spillage for the
cryogenlc-fueled aircraft. In contrast, tilecol*ventlonally fueled aircraft
will continue to have both this problem, plus the vulnerability of wing tanks
which has been sho_a*, in tile foregoing anal>sis, to be the major factor leading
to fuel spillage.
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The other two eras|* scenarJo_,i,Non. I and 4p represented eases In which
crash damage was not relevant.
Cra_th seea:ir_o No. ], stated as i!u]]uws: "A nor,lal ]andlng, or ground
aeeJdent_ whleh re:;ult,q_u fuel system insulation damage and/or fuel system
damage permltt_ng IJqu:Id hydruf,en to ven_, escape, ]oak, or run out of a
1_tmetnred tank or broken llne," ,_:houldbe considered an accident in which only
smn]] leakage rates couhl occur because control of flow via shutoff valves
aud boost pump us_gfi are control]able by the crew. This situation would come
about as a result of a long davelopJng problem (metal fatigue) or, it could be
malntenanco related as opposed to crash damage.
_" Crash scenario No. 4 _s a situation where the aircraft plunges tO the
ground and all on board are killed by the impact. The question to be resolved
is, what is the hazard to the surrounding community represented by the in-
stantaneous release of the fuel aboard at the moment of impact.
3.5 Bceuario Danmge Definition
lu light of the damage which is apt to b_ inflic=ed on the subject air-
craft in tilepostulated scenarios, as described in the preceding section, an
atxalysis was made to determine what fuel leakage might be expected to result
wi_h each of the four fuels.
By way of review, the cryogenic fuels (LH2 and LCH4) are stored in
insulated tanks located both forward and aft of the passenger compartment.
The non-cryogenic fuels (Jet A and JP-4) arc stored in the wing and in
center section tanks. As li_ted in table 2, the sub_ect aircraft carry the
following total fuel loads:
LH 2 25,600 kg ( 56,460 ib)
LCII4 69,040 kg (152,200 ib)
Jet A 84,780 kg (186j900 ib)
JP-4 84,780 kg (186,900 ib)
All of Lhe airc_af_ have four eugiues mouuLcd on pylons below the wing.
The location of the fuel teaks and engiues dictates the primary effect
u_ Impact damage ou fucl leakage. Wheu fuel tanks are located it* the wing, i
impact damage t(_fuel lines within _he wing is uf little concern because
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of th, _ _-_xcesfl;[ve fuel tank dnmago i:hat must occur before i:he fuel lines are
tmlmet:od, Ill all other area_, such as enRlue_, engine pylolls, and fuel lines
I external co file], tanks, fuel line 1,mkaRe is of {2etl{2erll,
Each eu_ine is assumed to bc '_upplled fuel from it_ own individual fuel
tank. '1%_ofuel pumps wurc used in each noncryogenic fucl tank and _hroe ill
I each cryosenlc tank.
Althoush as has been poiutsd out, tilefuselage tanks of tho cryosaaic
& fuels are considered loss apt to be seriously damaged so as to leak fuel Illan
i impact" survivable crash, compared with the wlng tanks of the conventionally
_-" fueled aircraft', tileproblem at this junct.ure was not to assess probabilities
but. to decide on credlble damage which could occur in order to analyze '.he
consequences of fuel spillage. Accordingly, fuel tank damase was assumed to
vary from a small puncture or a cracked weldment permlttlng a leak of 0.5 kg
per second, to a major tank rupture. In the lat.t.erease, all average spill
rare was determined by assuming that. all of tile fuel tanks in the designated
area released their fuel within a 30-second period.
Fuel line leakage is significantly affeet.ud by '.heoporatlon of boost.
pumps. If the pump power source is turned off prior to the crash, spillage
would be the result of gravit'y drain through a severed fuel line. For use in
the subsequent, analyses, minimum leakage was established by assuming one
broken line only, fed by gravity or siphon action. }fax|mum leakage assumed
all fuel lines in '.hearea were broken wit'h all boost pumps operating when
applicable.
Table 16 prevldus a summary of leak rat'os and quantities which were
adopted to represent _he Lll2-fueled alrcrafL it,tileanalyses of Scenarios i,
2, 3, and 4 described ill '.hefollowing sections. The fuel quantities listed
in tiletable for Scenario 4 represent tlm amounts of hydrogen assumed to
remain in the aircraft after, in the first case, a crash following Laxl,
'.eke-off, and climb to about' 1.8 km (6000 ft'). The second value listed is
_or the sit'eat'ionwhore the aircraft has flown its design mission atld is
near its destination when it crashes wlth only a little more than reserve
fuel on board.
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',L'ABLE10. - _RA.qll _].',I,'UATI(.)NANO FUEL £PILLAGE FOR LII2_}..'UL'_LEI)AIIL(JI_.FT
Lit, Spill
I_ata Dun_ltitY
SItuatloll I)nnla9O (ko/IoC,) (kg)
Scenario1 Aircraftel rest,Smellinter.elleak. Crackedwoldontank 0,0.5 1,000
Scenario2 Aircraftstopped5y Impactat EnglnoseparationorfuselageIh_abrook. 12,600
::40 kts. Radialspill, I 0eastPump+Off 0,5
• BoostPumpsOz; 2,3
Tmlkponcturadorripped. 960
) Scenario3 Damageoccursot = 120kts. LonU
_.. axialspillasaircraftdecelerates (SameesSce,ario
Scenario4 Catn_trophiccrush.Largeradialspill. All teAksruptured. _ 21,600
2,160
Corresponding leakage races and spill quantities for thu oth,'r fuolu wecu
arbitrarily assumed Co be in the ratios of the fuel quantities tanked, viz.,
69,040
_5,600 " 2.7 £or LCII4, and
84,?80 _ 3.3 for Jet A and JP-4.
25,600
b
b
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4. CO_'V,t'ER MODELS AND NETIIODOLOG¥
The computer models and methodology used to calculate the spread,
vaporization, and dispersion of spilled aircraft fuels lvto the atmosphere
are provided in this Section. For a fuel leak within the aircraft, a method
is provided for calculating the required air purge rate in the compartment
_ to reduce the alr/fuel mixture ratio below its flammable limit. Finally, a
thermal model is described for calculating heat transfer rates and tempera-
tures of an aircraft fuselage (both external and interns].) that is exposed
to flames from spilled liquid fuel.
4.1 Aircraft Fuel Liquid Spill, Spreading and Vaporization Models
An analytical model was initially developed to solve for the liquid
spill, spreading and vaporization processes that would occur following the
rupture of aircraft tanks or lines. Two models were developed, one for axial
spread of the liquid perpendicular to the direction of aircraft motion, and
the other for radial spread of the liquid from a fixed aircraft position. A
flat, horizontal spill surface was assumed, and no dikes or boundaries were
present to limit the extent of the liquid spread. Concrete and sell (with
10% moisture) were the two spill surfaces considered in these programs.
These models are applicable to all liquids, including the cryogenic fuels
and the conventional petroleum-based fuels considered in this study.
The liquid spreading and vaporization processes were modelled using open
channel, hydraulic flow methods ,_fanalysis. In this anal_,sis, no combustion
is assumed to occur over the liquid spill and spread, and hence the unburned
fuel vapors will disperse into the atmosphere. Applying both conservation o_
mass and horizontal momentum, two partial differential equations are obtained
which define the liquid flow, as shown below for the axial spreading model
case:
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onl_Br _ nl _h '
r_t,_| j ,. 4
(_)1:I_t_'4,'I: ,.
Con_ervatlon of Nasa:
'J_"Jl:+ _Jx + v_ ,,, o (1)
Cotmervatlonof Momentu_n: _ + _ + gb i)_._+ f,:x _x Tvlvl- o (2)
whore
t - time from the start of the uptl._
i x - axial distance from the canter of the spill llne
V - mean horizontal velocity of the liquid flow
6 = liquid flow depth
g = acceleration of gravity
VE = rate of fall of still liquid surface, due to evaporation, e_c.
f - Fanning friction factor for open channel flow
These partial differential equations were then converted to ordiuary
differential equations with respect to time, using the method of characteristics,L
as presented in Reference (18). These ordinary differential equations are
then grouped in terms of the positive sod negative characterlsitcs of the
d-_'Xslope, as shown below:dt
f
5_+ _dt + _VE - VVE ® VIV[=0
Positive
dx characteristic (3)
--= V + kdt
6dVdt-_dt'_XV_- VV_+_ vlvl- 0
Negative
dx characteristic (4)
dt = V - k
where _ - _V_5 - wave velocity.
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!Colnput:_r_olutinn_ of tileabove differential _quatlon8 wer_ _h(-ulpro_;ramm;,d
for a Uldvaf' 1100 _omputor, u_lng on _xp]iclt _|)o_'if_edtime l:_tervil]met:hod
of soautlon, similar to Sectiou ]5.4 of Refer(._llco(IS).
In t'heabove formulaklo1_, ou]y thc__;v_H}oratlont_rn, VE and the frlctJon
factor f are dependent on fluid prow_rtlea. The (_vaporatien term VE roprv-,
s_o_s the rate of fall of a still liquid uurface due to ewlporati(m, boi]lu_,,
or _eopase of liquid in_,) sui], etc. For cryoge.ic liquid boi1_ng on a sur-,
face, the evaporation t+rm V_, can be found from the following re]atlon_hlp,
_L (5)
PL hfg
where
OL = liquid density
hfg - latent heat of vaporization
q" - heat rate per unit area from the solid surface
The transient heat flux q" from a semi-infinite spill surface can be predicted
from Section 13-3 of Reference (19). For an initial time period, this heat
rate is limited by the boiling burn-out heat flux of the spl]]ed cryogenic
liquid. After that, the heat flux depends on the solid surface therma] pro-
perties, and varies inversely with the square-root of time t.
The term f represents a Fanning friction factor for open channel flow,
derived from Section 4.2 of Reference (20), which must be expressed in the
following form,
-4 lOglo + (6)
b
where . { n _6
de _0.03779_ = length parameter defining .urface roughness.
n - Manning's roughness coefficient, see References (20), (21). etc.
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45Vp L
• Re - ijL .- Reynolds number of the flow
i_L - liquid viscosity
The first term in the logaritl_ bracket represents the effect of surface
roughness, while the second represents _hc effects of flew Reynolds number
for turbulent flows. The Fanning friction factor for laminar flow. f - 16/Re,
was only used for low Reynolds number flows, where the laminar flow f exceeded
the above turbulent flow f value. Hence, the flow friction factor and shear
stress were defined for the full range of surface roughnesses and flow Reynolds
numbers.
In order to make a time integration of the characteristic differential
equations, the boundary and initial conditions must be specified. Figure 13
shows the inlet flow _oundary and initial conditions at the spill location.
Two inlet boundary conditions are possible, depending on whether the Froude
" number retie of inlet velocity to wave velocity is less or greater than unity.
At the initial time t - 0, the spill surface is completely dry, while the Inl-
tlal inlet Froude number must be 51.0.
The advancing free leading edge boundary condition is presented on Fig-
ure 14. Wlth Froude number Fr _ 1.0 at the advancing leading edge of the flow,
this fluid boundary cannot influence the method of characteristics solution
interior to the liquid flow body. The total time derivatives of the depth 5
and the flow per unit width (SV) were obta2ned from the partial differential
equations, and expressed in terms of partial derivatives with respect to
dx
distance x. These equations both follow the characteristic velocity_- V,
which is the velocity of the advancing leading edge.
A final boundary condition, that involving receding free liquid edges in
the final stages of fluid flow and vaporization, is shown on Figure 15. At a
receding liquid edge, both the liquid depth 6 and velocity V are zero, and the
momentum effects are small. The edge will recede due to vaporization, and the
location of the edge can be computed by conservation of mass in the triangular
wedge shaped edge elements. Receding edges can develop at a leading edge that
stops advancing, or at the liquid inlet posltlon_ x - O, after the inlet liquid
flow has ceased,
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_._ • Inlet conditions, at X o O, depend upon the inlet flow froude number.
- eR. v .._v._,v
• For sub-critical inlet flow, with FR _1.0:
- Only the inlet liquid flowrete ten be specified
- The inlet velocity and depth ere variables, end ere computed
in combifletion with the method of cheracteristics, t
• For super-critical inlet flow, with FR > 1.0:
-- Both the inlet f|owrete e_d velociW head must be specified
i - The inlet velocity end depth are fixed and independent of
the liquid flow field at X > 0
• The initial liquid inlet flow must he one o; these conditions:
- Critical flow, Fr : 1.0
- Super-critical flow. Fr :> 1.0
F£Sure ]3, - Znlac flow boundary coi_d_tlons.
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, t
i
• I:mude ,umlmr FI! • • 1.0 ,t th# ,(Iv#uui#g leedlt)ge¢lile.
j • Conserving iness(}n(I Ilionlentunl. the lilirtJal dJfforonttul eciguthnls (In! nSllll
to form this Iol_dJnyerie, mo(Iol:
"-- = .... '_ V ' '_'_ -Vo • .t, V
dt i) t ;)x l) x il x
d(_V) O(_V) _1(_ V) f _2) _ (6V)....... ,.v ..... vlvl_± (_v2,_ +v ,-
dt _)t _)x 2 _)x 2 () x
dxr
L -- = V, Leading edge velocitydt
I
• For FR 91.0, tim advancing leading edge does not Influence the method of characteristics solution
in the liq,id body.
I t+A t -_ I
, 22._
J-1 l J+l X
FLgura 14.- AdvancLng )eading edge boundary coadLtLon.
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• Flow conditionl at e re_ding liquidedge:
V-O,
6_ O,
• Momentumeffootl smellit reQedlngliquidudp
• ConloPaationof mall isusedto computeliquid edgelocation,baledon:
- Triangularwedgeshapeof liquidvolumenearthe edge
- Averageflowrateendvaporizationat wedgeduring At time step
6 I
t.... I J
J-1 j J+l X
Figure 15. - Receding free edge boundary condition.
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Computer programs ware developed and run for beth tile axial spreading
model presented above end for a similar radial, liquid spill, spreading and
vaporization model. Even though some cases have been run successfully on both
programs, most cases run on these programs have showll computations] lnst:abi]i-
ties. This problem appears at the free edge boundaries, and it is apparently
due to the finite differencing techniques needed to match the edge beundary
conditions to the characteristic solution in the liquid pool. Many different
approaches have bean tried to solve this problem, but uouo have be_n successful
to date.
Two stably computed runs, with LH2 spilling on a concrete runway, are
presented for an axial spread, figure 16, and for a radial spread, figure ]7.
The axial spread resulted from a 900 kg/sec spill of hydrogen occurring from
an aircraft skidding along the runway at 120 knots. Figure 16 shows the axial
extent of the spread x measured perpendicular to the spill center line as a
function of time t at one spot on the runway. The outer curve (square-dote)
shows the advancing outer edge of the spread out to where it stops and starts
to recede as the liquid evaporates. The inner receding edge (circle-dots)
starts with dry-up near the center at t = 9 seconds and then recedes out to
e final dry-up at x = 5 meters and t = 11.5 seconds.
Figure 17 shows the results of a 108 kg radial spill of LH 2, which occurs
over a I0 second time span at a fixed position. The center dries up soon
after the flow ceases, while the final dry-up occurs at r = 4 meters and
t = 17 seconds. For both the radial and axial flow cases, central dry-up may
or may not occur, depending on the central liquid depth, the liquid inlet flow
momantt.u,the rate of vaporization, etc.
For comparison, the results of simple constant depth slab evaporation
models are plotted as dashed lines on figures 16 and 17, based upon the work
of Fay, reference 22. These Fay models assume the leading edge Froude number
is = 1.4, since V = \F_, end hence they overpredict the spread of the lead-
ing edge, by up to = 20_. Vaporization stops instantaneously with these con-
stant depth models, and the wider liquid spread yields a faster dry-up time,
by up to = 40_. Based upon these and other comparisons, it appears that the
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F rOF pt; _,. "' ....
Axl¢l aproadmodel,L f"1, M - 1, ZN "0.016, W2" 12000.000, H1 - 0.000.
XA '_064.3, VA " 61.733, XO " 0.50, I'AMB " 300.08, TLIQ * 20.28, NI " 3a
0.0 1.8 3.0 4.5 6.0 7.5
X = Axial spread- meters
Fisure ]6. - Axial spread model comparison with Fay model.
Radial spreadmodel, L = 1, M - 1, ZN _-0.015. W2 = 108.02, H1 - 0.093, R2 _ 10.8,
H3 = 6.000, XO = 0,50, TAMB " 300.00, TLIO - 20,28, NI "64
18.0
15.0
i,!
o.o_
0,0 1,5 3.0 4,8 6,0 7,5
R = Radialspread- maters
F_gure 17. - Radial spread model comparison with Fay model,
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Fay models can predict the extent and time of the liquid s_read within the
limits _rnsented above. With tile Fay models, the maxim_ rate of evaporation
occurs when the liquid fir_t roaches its point of maximtun spread, and thisrat¢_ may be up to = 50_ greater than the computer model resu].';s.
Because of our inability to make morn than few s_able with tile
a runs
spill, spreading and vaporization computer programs, it was finally decided
i to use models te predict the behavior of the Scsnario spills in this
slab
b study. Based upon similar approaches as Fay, reference (22), slab spreading
I models were derived which predict the maximum extant of the spread, the timeto reach the maximum extent, and the maximum rate of vaporization from the
_ liquid spread at this time. These models were developed for an instantaneous
axial spill at one location along the spill centerllne, and for both an in-
stantaneous and a continuous radial spill at a fixed location on the spill
surface.
The instantaneous axial spill corresponds to a spread at a fixed point,
perpendicular to the spill centerline velocity of the aircraft. The following
Fay model equations were derived for this instantaneous axial spill and spread.
x'i3 (7)
!
1.4 qot
m VE XmL
• !
mE ,m 2pL VE Xm
where
Xm - maximum half axial spread, from spill centerllne
tm time to maximum axial spread
_ " maxlmum mass rate of vaporization per unit spi]l ]ength,
q: - volume of liquid spill per unit of spill eanterllne length,
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The Fay model aquatlons for an lustantaneo.s radla] split at ono location
on the spill surfac- arc glvcn b_ow.
rm " ' \'_-T/ _ f
• 2
= _ r VE PLmE m
where
r = maximum radius of the spread from the center.
m
Qo " total volume of the liquid spilled
mE = maxlmu_ rate of vaporization from the liquid spread.
For a continuous (steady-flow) radial spill at a fixed location, the following
experessions were obtained for a slab spreading model,
/iol
rm "\_v_ / (9)
, [4r2 ] 1/3t - 0.7
= 2 VE PL
I mE _ rm
I where
, r - maximum, radius of the spread (also the st_ady-_tate radius)
m
qo " volume rate of the liquid spill
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The above Yay models for predicting the maximum extent, time. and
vaporization rate for the various spill typos are moat applicable when the
still rate of liquid fell due to evaporation, VE, has e constant value. If
the te_m VE varies with distance and time, as it does with vaporization due to
conduction heat transfer from the base surface, then care must be used in
applying these medals. In this case, an average heat flux must be used for
the extent of the spread at the maximum time, and a trial end error solution
is required to marsh this average heat flux to the assumed liquid vaporization
rates. Rence, these Fay models only provide an estimate of the liquid spill
performance, but they do allow comparisons of different liquids as to types
_ and scale of the spreading and vaporization.
For the radial spreads, the instantaneous model was used for spill times
smaller than the maximum spread time, while the continuous model was used for
all other cases. In this study, axial spills were only computed with the air-
craft in motion so only an instantaneous spill model was needed to predict
this spill performance.
4.2 Aircraft Fuel Gaseous Dispersion Model
An aircraft fuel gaseous dispersion model (AFGASDM) was designed to pre-
dict the position and fuel vapor concentration at any tlm¢ after the spill is
on the ground end until the vapor ooneentratlon drops below the lowest flam-
mable concentration.
Although the literature contains complex grid models using the partial
differential equetlon_ of motion and conservation (reference 23) end traditional
gausslen dispersion models (reference 24), none of these were suitable to solve
the problem of aircraft fuel spills. This new, innovative model was developed
on basic physical prlnolplee and knowledge of turbulent entrainment (refer-
ence 25). The Saussian models are unsuitable because they compute concentra-
tions based on averaging times of at least 10 minutes, a requirement set by the
empirical development of the Pasquill-Gifford diffusion coefficients (refer-
ence 26). NASA spills of liquid hydrogen indicated dispersion times of less
than 1 minute (13). The complex grid models are unsuitable because they re-
quire implementton on large computers like the C_ay-1 and each run of such
models costs many thousands of dollars.
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The approach described hare was deelgnad Co prodict the spatial position
of the gaseous fuel at each second in time as the liquid fuel vaporizes. The
concern is the maximL_ distance downwind end maxim_ height above the spill at
which the gas is flammable. The lowest detonab]e concentration is higher than
the lowest flammable concentration, hence the maximum distance of detonablei
Kas is less than the maximum distance of flammable gas. One second was
I chosen as o convenient interval of time to repeat the computations of energy,
mass and momentum conservation. The model can easily be adjusted for any
I other interval of time. For the cases reported here, much smaller time
) intervals are expected to increase the computing cost without appreciable
increase in accuracy of the predictions, while much larger time intervals
are expected to reduce the accuracy and resolution of the predictions. Thei
accuracy is defined as the closeness with which the model can predict the
)
measured results of field experiments. The resolution is the difference in
predicted results the model can compute for cases with different input
conditions. I
The model can be run repetitively for each 1 second "puff" of gaseous
fuel that vaporizes from the liquid. For economy of computer time and cost,
only the largest puff is followed by the model for the present work. This
1-second-long puff is largest when the liquid spill has its maximum area and
the liquid vaporization rate is highest. All ocher puffs travel smaller dis-
tances before the gaseous fuel coneentratlon is dispersed below the lowest
flammable concentration.
r An important aspeo_ of this puff model le that the "observer" travels
with the puff in a Lagrengf.an coordine_e system whose origin is the center of
the puff volume. Ambient air is turbulently entrained into the puff through
the aldea end part of the top and bottom. The behavior of this turbulent
entrainment is taken from the simile: appearing turbulent dynamics of cumulus
clouds. The gaseous hydrogen dynamics in the NASA White Sands experiments
were marked with cloud water droplets and observed in movies and in trani-
parencies supplied by NASA.
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The prnpartion of puff top and bottom available for entrainment is
determined by the ascent angle of the puff. There are other puffs before and
after the largest puff tracked by the modal. If the ascent is vertical, thee
no part of the top or bottom is an entrainment surface. If the puff motion
i_ horizontal along _he ground, than part of the top but uon_ of the bottom
_s available for entrainment.
After all the conservation equations are solved, the resulting aecelera-
tion and velocity determine the vertical and horizontal displacement of the
puff center in a set of Eulerian (fixed) coordinates with the origin at the
center of the top surface of the liquid spill pool.
The model is designed to handle four fuels: hydrogen, methane, Jet A
and JP-4. The initiation of the modal is the maximum liquid fuel area and
evaporation rate. The evaporation rate is _he depth of liquid lost per unit
time to vaporization. The initial temperature of the gaseous hydrogen or
methane is set at the boiling point at ambient pressure. The model is cur-
rently designed to accept an input ground elevation of mean sea level. The
model can easily be adjusted for any other ground elevation.
The initial puff horizontal geometry is set equal to the liquid spill
geometry. In Scenarios 2 and 4, the hypothetical aircraft is at rest and the
liquid spill is circular. In Scenario 3, the aircraft is spilling liquid fuel
while decelerating from ]20 knots, heading into tha wind. These Scenario 3
spills are axial and the model is developed on a unit length of i meter down
the runway. We assume that every other unit length will have similar gaseous
puffs arising from the liquid. In the axial spills, the puff tracked by the
model has other puffs in front and in back, as well as on top and underneath.
This geometry of adjacent puffs is important to modeling the entrainment of
ambient air because no entrainment is assumed across interfaces with adjacent
puffs, This assumption is equivalent to assuming the propertlss of adjacent
puffs are close enough to those of the tracked puff that mixing across the
interface would change no properties being conserved.
For each Scenario, a mode] of the liquid spreading and vaporization
dynamics (see previous Section) is used to provide the liquid evaporation
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rate and the spill maximum radius e_ ma,_im_.a axial width, _he critics! input
variable_ for the dtsporsio_ model.
Other input variab]e_ are the atmospheric stability, wind speed at
10 meters, surface temperature and relative humidl_y. '_he surfaae temperaLure
is used as the initial temperature of the de*" a and JP-4 spills. The relative
humidity is assumed constant thro-ghout the layer In which the gaseous fuel
puffs are entraining ambient air. This layer i_ no deeper then 782 meters in
the Scenarios. The wind speed is assumed to have a power law profile of the
form:
u(z)- U(Zo)(_/p (I0)
_-o/
where
z = reference height above groundo
U(Zo) = wind speed aC reference height
p = power law exponent.
The reference height is the meteorological standard height of I0 meters. The
power law exponent is set equal to 0.2 based on field measurements in e neu-
trally stable atmosphere. The wind speed at the reference height is set by
the model user only for a neutral atmosphere. It is constrained to reasonable
values selected for the other five stability categories. The six categories
are labeled A through F, with A being the most unstable and F being the meet
stable (reference 26). The reference height wind speeds in meters per second
are given in table 17.
The temperature profile is different for each stability, decreasing with
height most rapidly for stability category A and increasing most rapidly for
category F. The stability is chosen by the model user for the mixing ]ayer,
assumed here to be the lowest 200 meters of the atmosphere, above which the
stability is assumed co be neutral.
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TABLE 17. - A_OflPIIERIC STABILITY CONDITIONS
ffefer..co
_IP _tfih[(ilChls_ fl_ghtWind Speed LQlilO
Letter NumLl_r (ml_c} I_tu{KIk_}d
A 1 2 .40
i} 2 3 -30C 3 5 -20
0 4 Afly -10
!m E 5 3 0
l_ F 6 2 +lQ
:m-- I ....
m The puff to be tracked with the model is defined when the liquid spill
i
achieves maximum area. For liquid hydrogen or methane, the vaporization
during the first second determines the vertical thickness of the puff. _le
mass of fuel vaporized is given by:
mf = EP_ A_ At or EPQ A_ (i.0 sec) (ii)
where
mf = mass of gaseous fuel in puff (g)
E = evaporation rate (m/sac)
_ p_ - density of liquid fuel (g/m3)
A_ = maximum area of liquid (m2)
The rapid vaporization rate of the cryogenic fuels is our Justification for
assuming the initial puff is pure gaseous fuel, not yet containing ambient air
to be turbulently entrained, ltence, the volume of this puff is given by:
V = mf/pg
where (12)
V - puff volume (m3)
?l
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pg m det_sity of gaseous £ual at 1 atmosphere pressure
and boiling point tomperature (g/m 3)
and Its thickness is:
4Zp - v/Ae (13)
where ASp - vertical thickness of puff (m).
For circular spills, the radius is the horizontal measure of the total puff.
For axial spills, the down runway length of the spill is many times larger
than the transverse spill width, hence the puff is given a unit length of
l meter.
The initial puff above Jet A or JP-4 is not pure gaseous fuel because the
saturation vapor pressure of chess fuels is small. In order to make the dle-
perslon of gaseous fuel above these conventlonel fuels comparable wlth the
' dispersion of the gaseous cryogenic fuels, an initial puff thlcknese is set
at 7 em_ roughly the thickness of initial 1 second long puffs above the eryo-
genlc liquids• ThE conventional fuels evaporate into a slab of ambient air
brought over the liquid at the wind speed for mid puff height for the length
of tlme it takes to cross the liquid In the up runway direction. If the re-
sultlng gaseous fuel concentration reaches saturation, then the eaturntion vapor
pressure determines the concentration. If the initial concentration is smaller
than the lowest flammable concentration, then no model run is made.
Once the Inltlal puff is defined in shape, temperature, and gaseous fuel
concentration, dispersion begins by the entrainment of ambient alr and overall
t motion of the puff. The puff of a gaseous cryogenic fuel starts at the boiling
I
point of the cryogenle liquid, much colder than its surroundinge, The puff of
conventional gaseous fuel is assumed to always have the same temperature as the
i surroundings.
Modeling the *:urbulent entrainment is the critical part. Early computa-
tions demonstrated that molecular diffusion of hast, mass:or momentum wae
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ordern of magnitude smaller than turbulent diffusion. This finding was
suppartod by the movies of the NASA White _ands hydrogen spills, where the
vigorous turbulsnaa was marked visually by the motion of condensed water drop _
lets, The model accounts for two possible contributions to the an_rainment
velocity, the rata at which amblcnt air penetrates the puff-elf Interface nor-.
real to tho surface. Tim first coutrlbution is proportloual to the relative
velocity between the overall puff and the air around it:
uI = 0.124 2 + (14)
whore
uI _ first term of entrelnment voloclty (m/s)
w = vortical ascent voloelty of puff (m/s)
U(Zp) 1 horizontal wind speed at height of puff center (m/s)
u ffi horizontal voloclty of puff (m/s).P
The constant (0.124) was taken directly from reference 25. In the vertical
direction the puff is moving through quloscont air, while in the horizontal
plane the wind is moving air paot the puff. The puff is dragged along by
the wind through the process of entraining air, subject to the conservation
of horizontal momont_. Horizontal momentum must be conserved because there
is no not horizontal force applied to the ambient air system surrounding the
puff.
The second contribution to the entralnmont veloclty only appllos to the
cryogenic fuels. It is based on the vigorous mixing induced Just above the
liquid surface by the high boillng (vaporization) rate. This term is given
by:
u2 = _(p_/pg) (vo/v) (15)
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whore
u2 - seceded term of eut_:ai_m_l%tvelocity (_/_)
V " initial ve]tm_.e of puff (m3)
E - evaporation rate (m/s)
This second te_m was made preportion_ 1 to the evapor.t:ion ra_t:. The ratio of
densi_le:_ gives thu volume sx[.,anslunof a unit mass of cryogenic 31quid as it
vaporizes. The puff volume ratio reduces the luflueue_ of this term as the
puff srows and moves away from _he liquid surface.
The sum of the _wo tem,s _ives the total entralmnent vu]o,'i_y:
ue - uI + u2 (3.6)
where
u = entrainment velocity (m/s),e
The entrainment velocity is multiplied by the time increment (1 second) and
"the entrainment surface of the puff to get the volume of air entrained Into
the puff each second:
V - u _t A (17)
e e e
where
_t m time increm_nt (sec.)
A - entrainment area of puff.e
The entrainment area of the puff is less than the total area of the puff. The
entrainment area is the sum of the puff side area and the _xpoaed parts of the
puff top and bottom:
A - A + AT + AB (18)
e s
?4
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whets
A - eP,,£r_intF_.g slds a1:ea _f pHff (a 2)
/%,i,, " ontraillill£ t(;|l arun of puff (m2)
and AU - outl:altllngbu_tom arLu_ e.f puff (m2)
I 01tly :If the puff t'in_n ft'um Lht,. gt'outid cau the bet:tel, h_ uxp_od tu turbtt]_i_t,
I unl:rt_iument of .ut'rounding air. Tim top of the puff ;I.. part;Jttlly _x|._,ud fol:
snl;rai_nene except if it r,'tnus ,'tz'aight up. For a cll;cu]ltr .1),1]1:
An -AZp(t) 2_, r(t) (]_))
}-
. ,,r2(t)I x(t)/2r(t)) ('0)
2
where
r(t) = puff radius (m) as a funetlon of tlm¢ t
AX(t) " amount of downwind movement of puff center (at.
The ratio_x(t)/2r(t) gives the proportion of thu puff top or bottom exposed
to surrounding air. The other parts of the top or bottom are covered by the
preceding and following puffs. For an axial spill, there are similar relations:
r As - 2Azp(t) hx(t) (21)
AT .A B = Lx(c)Ly(t)_ (22)
where
LX(t) " up runway length of axial puff (m)
hy(t) " crosswind (uroos runway) width of puff (m)
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In _ho ax/al canns. _h_ puff has neighboring puffs on its downwind and upwllld
sides, t_n w_11 as above and bo]ow,
Bolving the above _qut_t_ou_ ftu: th_ ontrall_tnent area and en_vain_d voaumv
of nil:allows computation _f th_ _ntvaiuad mass:
wher..
Itlt_ _. I,_lss (g) of tlir ont_uincd duriug a ti_nt_ irAcrcmt_nt
#n(zp) ._ density of air at height of pttff (g/m 3)
This entrained mass of air is added to the existing puff mass to Set tilenew
puff mass. The initial puff mass for _he cryogenic spills was glwn by
EquatJon ii. The initial puff mass for _he conventional fuels is given by:
VoP (Zpo)Zpm - ' (24)
po R* Ta(Zpo)
where
m _ initial puff mass (g)
pc
P - pressure of atmosphere (dyne/cm 2)
z • initial puff height (m)
pc
M - puff mcleaular weight (g/mole)
P
R_ - universal gas constant (eel/mole K)
T - temperature of ambient air (K)
e
The puff molecular weight depends on the molecular fractious of gaseous fuel
and air:
Hp - Mf F + Me (l-F) (25)
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who rs
Mf - fuel molecular weight (g/mole)
Ha = a_ mo_ecu]_1: weight _ 28,9 g/mo]_
l,' . fuel ilmlu fraction
The _uel mole Erect/on is al_output of t|l_mod_tJ aftoF th_ comllutat_on8 I:o_
each rime Incremel_t:
+ "al)
where
F = initial fuel mole fraction
o
_m - torsi, entrained air mass,
t e
Now the'information derived from the conservation of mass allows application
of the conservation of euthalpy. The entrained enthalpy is given by I
IIe " meCpaTa(Z p) (27)
wh_ re
H = enthalpy of air entrained during time increment (calories)e
C _ speclfic heat capacity of air a_ constant pressure (calories/g K)
pa
Ta(Zp) ffi temperature o_ air at puff height (K),
Conservation of enthnlpy proceeds stepwiae for each thermodynamic process
P
oceurrinR during each time increment. This stepwise solution nf the new puff
temperature he:wean each tham_udynamlo process provides a higher degree of
I accuracy in specifying the temperature. The thermodynamic processes that are
i handled in the model are: I) the heatlug of the gaseous fuel by the warmer
entrained air, 2) the condensation of water vapor In the entrained air as it
is cooled by tile gaseous fuel, 3) the freezing of the water droplets upon
further cooling, 4) tile melting of these same frozen hydrometeore later in the
llfe of the puff, and 5) tile evaporation of the wa_er droplets still later,
77
00000001-TSG02
Conealvably th_ initla] aryegaalc temperature (20.3 K) of Lha Jlquid
hydrogen can cause a_,Io_phariao_),ge,lto eondonHe at 90 K and nitrogen to con-
dense at 78 K. _he condensation of "hast molecules would cause a rapid local
dapr_asion in the pressure and collapse of the volum_ affected. 'Jlm heating
of rite cryogenic temperature gaseous fuv] to temperatures above these bolli.g
paints le _m rapid, a few seconds, 'hat rite Is'eat heat released in _he con-
densation i_ almost immediately reabuorbod by the subsequent evapora!:ton.
There is, hence, no effect: on _ha overall anghalpy eonst_,rwltion,
Just considering the first thermodynamic process, heating Cite gaeeou:_
_ fuel and cooling the entrained air, the Intermediate puff rempezaturc is
given by :
II + H
T t m e p
p Cpp (mp + me ) (28)
where
T' - puff temperature resulting from heating of cryogenic gaseousP
fuel (K)
Hp - puff enthalpy before adding air entrained during time increment
(calories)
Cpp - specific heat capacity of pul!f at constant pressure (caloriee/g K)
The specific heat capacity of the puff is:
Cpp(F,Tp) Cpf(Tp)MfF + Cp a Ma(1-F)" M (29)
P
where
Cpp(F,Tp) - puff specific heat capacity at constant pressure as a
function of fuel mole fraction and puff temperature (cal/g K)
Cpf(Tp) - gaseous fuel specific heat capacity at constant pressure as
a function of puff temperature (cal/g K)
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_n order to compute if water vapor in the e_l_rained air will condense, the
water vapor pressure in the ambient air is found from
o -h to
I
where
b o - water vapor pressure in ambient air (ml]]ibars)
) h " relative humidity in ambient air
a m constant . 9.4051
b - constant - 2353
The saturation water vapor p_essure in the puff at temperature T' is:P
e -iO [a- (b/T;_ (31)
sp
where
m
esp saturation water vapor pressure in puff (millibars)
The entrained water vapor will condense if asp < e. If the water vapor
condenses, then the latent heat of condensation will provide enthalpy to
further warm the puff:
tle + lip +m w Lw
T " - (32)
p ,'
Cpp(F,1p) (mp + me
where
Tp" - intermediate puff tsmperature after condensation (K)
mw - water vapo_ mass in entrained air (g)
Lw - latent heat of water vapor condensation (eel/g)
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NoLo the similarity of this equation with (28). The water vapor mass entrained
and available for condensation is:
- e V Nw/R*TlnW e R
I where
M - Molecular weight of water (g/Mole)
w|
i The condensation of entrained water vapor leads to a test of the inter-
medlars puff temperature T " in order co see if it is low enough to induce
_+ p
freezing of the water droplets. If T "<253 K, the droplets are assumed to
P
freeze. This temperature is chosen as a compromise between 233 KD when all
liquid water will freeze, and 273 K, when water with many impurities will
freeze. The presence of ice nuclei in the atmosphere will encourage the
freezing process, facilitating its occurrence at a higher temperature within
the range of 255 K to 273 K. There is no need to put this nuclei dependence
in the model because the required input information does not relate directly 'I
to the aircraft fuel questions of interest here. Agaln, the puff temperature
is recomputed, using the relation:
H + H + ttl (Lw + L_)T"' = _w (33)
p pp.._p . (rap+ me)
where
T'" - intermediate puff temperature a_ter fusion (K)
P
L' m latent heat of fusion of water (eel/g).w
The conservation of enthalpy part of the model also keeps track of the melting
of frozen hydromoteors and the evaporation of condensed water droplets later in
the dispersion of the puff _hen it becomes sufficiently warm. The frozen
hydromvteors are melted when the temperature of _he puff rises above 233 K and
the condensed water droplets evaporate when e < esp. The temperature after
these processes is T ''''
P
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01" t_ ';
At the end of "he con_e_cvatiun of entha)py cemputntions, the fina) puff
temperature in used to eomput_ th_ puff density from:
p(z )M
,,__J]L,_IL,,,, (34)Pp R* TP
The new volume of the puff is given by:
I , m (_)+m (t)
v -"_'_-7_ (35)
P
,4
The new linear dimensions of tilepuff are computed from the new volume assuming
tileprevious ratios of the linear dimensions are preserved. For a circular
spill,
r t _Z t
-- m _ (Se)
r AZ
P
V' = .(r')2Az ' (37)
P
/r"'
r, (]g)
and _Mp m AZp(rt/r) (]9)
where
r' - new puff radius (mr
Az' - new puff thickness (mr
P
V' " new puff volume (m3).
Similarly, for an axial spill,
' L*
m _ (40)
Ly Lx
81
00000001-TSG06
_Z i L'
__3! x
_z = %-- (41)
p x
V' - L' L' _z' (42)
X y T_
Lx'- (v' ,. )1/3 (43
I L' i L ' (44)
n,- Y Y (Lx/Lx)
a=_ - _zp(_/Lx) (45)
where the primed variables are the new linear dimensions as a result of the
puff expansion with entrained air.
The next part of the model computes the mass motion of the puff. Tile
buoyancy acceleration determines both the vertical motion of the puff and its
level of turbulence. Telford (reference 25) found that three-fourths of the
buoyancy potential energy resulted in turbulence in c_nulus clouds and tllc
remaining one-fourth resulted in vertical motion. Therefore, the net vertical
acceleration of the puff is
where
A - net upward acceleratlon of puff (m/a2)
g " acceleration of gravity (m/a2)
The net buoyant acceleration provldes the Impulse that must uqua] the
change in vertical momentum according to Newton's Second Law of Motion. The
impulse is the net upward force times the time increment. The initia| ver-
tical momentum iF the puff mass times the beginning vertical velocity whl]c
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rlm final vertleal momentum Js th_ comblucd ,m_ of puff alldell{:rlJi11_dair
tlmes tlm filml ver,'icalwloclty.
repASt ,. (rap+ me) w' ..mpw
Rearrauglng, we solve for _he flnaJ vertical veloclt'y:
m
P
w' - (w+ A At) m + m (47)
p e
where
w' is final vertical velocity after the net accoleratloa A has acted
on the puff durin E the time increment (m/s).
The new vertlcal position of the puff is found from
zp P
The computation of the new horSzontal position in response to the drag of the
wind munt al_o take into account conservation of horizontal momentUm because
there is no net horizontal force on the puff/elf system. Hence,
u'p " (mpUp  meu (Zp))/(mp e ) (49)
where
I
u' - new horizontal puff velocity after entrainiug air during time
P increment (m/e)
I
and
1
Xp - Xp+ + Up 2 _t (50)
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The owra11 ascent aug]t_ of tim puff rslative, to its starting point is
computed frets
-1
• tan (Zp/Xp) (51)
Once tile new vertical positiou of the puff in c¢)mputed with (48), tile puff
temp_:raturc ia corrected by tim dry adiabatic cool ling it cxpt, ricuccs as the
ambient presaurt_ drops during ascent. Tim corrected puff tempaz'acure in:
= T"" -I' - (52)
Tp P
whore
I' = final puff temperature corrected for adiabatic cooling of ascent (K)
P
l'- dry adiabatic lapse rate of the a_mosphere (K/m).
The dry adiabatic lapse ra_e is used hare because any release of latent heat
from the condensation of water vapor has already been handled in the computa-
tion of puff temperature during the conservation of anthalpy. The lapse rate
of the atmosphere is set in the lowest 200 motor layer for each stabl]ity
class as shown in table 17.
The lapse rate for class D (neutral stability) is set equal to the dry
adiabatic value. The equal Increments between classes la assumed for con-
vanishes, but the sequence is in the correct order with the correct alto.
4.3 Vapor Purge Model
This section describes a vapor purse model to be used with Scenario 1.
small-scale liquid spills into fuselage or wlng compartments within tileair-
craft. These small-scale liquid leaks are as_t_medto be contlnuoue, and they
may occur from either fuel tanks or fuel lines into adjacent fuselage or wing
structural compartments. These compartments are assumed to have liquid drain
holes at their bottoms, so that liquid pooling should not occur in the com-
partment volume. In order to reduce the hazard of combuatlon, it is desirable
to purge the combustible vapors from these compartments at a rate that would
maintain the vapor concentration below combustible limits. This purge could
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be a_c_m_pltshed with rail air fl,w throul_h I:h_ variou_ eompartme.nt_ durtug
flight:. _r w_t:h pumpod a.lr pur_ :if _ha aircraft 1_ oil the gr.und. The.
ebJ_l::lve. ,f thl.s _ect:Jon :/ll t¢_ dev_.]op e_llll-. _lmp]e mode]u that wt]] pri_dlct
l:he lmqu,_re.d air purl:¢_ ratoe t,u _ fuae[lOll of tlie ai_aumed fee] leakage refer;.
],'{w [he t!rye.|_e.fl:lc ]:hlu:ld., with a_]l--ucalo leakn Into cel,_partmenU_ ab.w
the be.:Ll.lng po:l.at tomp+_rature, eomp]e.te, vaporJzatfou of the liquid fue3 shou]d
occm: at th¢_ leakage r:z_e.. Except :Ln the immediate vicinity of the 1.quid
leak, the purge, air rate required to keep tim compartment volume below the
minimum combuatible limi_ of the fuel volume ratio or mole fraction ratio,
_ Ymin' can be expres_ed as a. volume flowrate ratio:
V7 " Ymia
where
= volumetric flowrate at atmospheric temperature and pressure.
Yzr,in " minimum combustibl_ mole fraction of fuel in the air.
m_ 8ub_cril)tS: F re.fer_ to fuel and A refer_ t_ air.
The above equation can be converted to a mass flowrate ratio by multiplying
by the appropriate molecular weight ratio.
where
r_ _ mass flowrate of fuel vapor or air.
M - molecular weight of fuel vapor or air.
Values greater than or eque_ to the above limiting flowrate ratios will ensure
a uoncombuatlble mixture i_: tilebulk of the compartment. If the liquid does
net completely vaporize a_tdsome drains from the compartment, then the above
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purge air f]owrateu wi]] be eo11_ervstlve, floweret, lJmre wl]] always he a
combut_tihl_,mlxture i_ th_ immodla_e vlclui_ 7 of _h_ cryog_u_e ]_quld pha_,
For the convent*anal p_.treleum--baaed t.ue3s, the purge n;lr flow raqu_re..-
me,it is much mere d:tffleult: I_o e_t_llulto. Foe axampl.t_, for Jut A tile fuel
vapm: pressure is less than atmospheric:, .o tim fuel vapor must diffuse t:hrougl,
a boundary layer into the purge a_r flow. Thi. heat and lease _:ratmfer pr.ee.sia a futtction of COlllp:lrtlllellt geonlotry and f:h)w ceaditious, the area of liquid
, vaporization, the temperature and pressure l.uv_la, etc. Because of limits iu
b study resourees_ it was decided nor to attempt to mode] and _olva for air
purge requiretaent_ with the ¢ouven¢ioual fuels, (;enerally apeaking, purge
_ airflow requirements for the lower vapor praseure conventional aircraft fuel.s
will be less than for leaks of the highly volatll_ _yog,_aic fuels.
g.4 lteat 'rrausfar Aualysie in Aircraft Fuel V:lxua
This section is concerned with an aircraft raishap or crash that will
result in a large-scale fuel spill with combustion c_curring adjacent to an
f 'intact fuselage cabin. The closed fueelage is aasLuned to he completely or ipartially imbedded in some large-scale poo_ burning flamen. The objective of
this section is to develop a heat transfer model that could be used to predictthe time required either to breach the fuselage cabin or to create life
t threatening internal cabin conditions _or the passengers.In this study, _he Lockheed L-1011 fus_:]age design was used as a rcp_'cseu-
tat*re It_del of the fuse/,a_e cabin of a lullS-range subsotlic aircraft, As dis-
cussed ill Sue:ties 3.3.2, flgure 8 presettted a cross suction aud view of the
fuselage cabiu design, while figure 9 illu,_tratud a typical cross section Of the
fuselage skit* and strlugers, tim fiberglass it:sulatiou, aud tlm *starlet honey-
comb side pau_l.I
i Ba_¢d upon this figure 9 cross s_ctlou, a thermal mudul of the fuse*age
eide.-wall was developed to ,-'ompuaetiletransient temperatures of this cross
section to flame heaging absorbed on the outer fuselage skin. The fuselage
skin and stringers %'_re comb*tied as the outer thern_,ilnode, absorbiug heat
from the flame_, while the intcrna] holleycomb side pane] node exchanged heat
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by fre_ convectlon wJth an air code In the cabJn, Th_ flber[_]as_Insulation
was repreflented by four theresa] nodes in uer_.er_, with cnnduet_on r,_sintauce
bt_tween t:h_,lll. Betll thOrlllal radiat_.en and free {20tlV_L_.tJlt heal traDs|p,_' was
ml_de)ed ill tile a_r gaps on each aide of tile f_brrgl_lsn Junu]at_fm. An o_p]_:lt
eolnt_Jou ef tile tlede t_tl|pi_r[ttu_'es as a fair'ties of t:il_lO was thl_a n,lv_d ou _
digital coulputt_r fnl: a rang_ of absorbed llCmt ratr.s ou t|le. fune:l_kg_. Nkiu.
A cablt| w'ludow esa_tl|bly arid t_J,'oSu Settles _afi ehowtl ou figure 10, Three
plastic window patle_ are profit!tit, which should have rad'C.atiou trzlllatll_.s_iolt
prope_'t._es Sitll_],ar to glass. A thermlt] ii|od_] ot,' tll_, w:[tld_w i)att_!e was not
doveloped_ however, because it would have required dovo].opment of the spectral
wavelength dlstr_batlou of tim various flames and modeling of the wavelength.-
dependent radiation tranumission and absorption of the window panes. The
task wan considered to be beyoud study resources aud schedule limitatious and
not of the importance to _uutify deleting other tasks.
Detailed thermal modeling of _he windows and tile flame heat sources would
yield an estimate of the radiation heat flux transmitted through tile windows
and the time required for the various fuel. flames to breach the windowe. There
is an obvious hazard to passengers posed by radiation heat transfer through
the windvws_ plus the suacaptabillty of the plastic windows to mel_ long before
the aluminmn structure of the cabin wall. However, a simple solution to the
problem is to provide heat resistant window shades with a reflective coating
on the outside surface. In event of a crash iu which fire results, passengers
exposed to high radiation heat flux would thereby have a means of protecting
themselves.
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5. ^NALY,gIS O1,'Clb%,_l!,qCI,_NAR'H_S
The r_sults of the mtalyscs for all four fuels are lucca,curedhcr_ i'oI:
the _utcrt1_d.leak (Scetmrlo I); the liquid Sl,il_,spro_dluf._and vaporization
which occur_ J,xxSc_narlos 2, 3 mid 4; the gaseous dispersion Into tlleatmo-
sphere asaoclat_d with Seeuarios 2, 3 aud 4 aud ClteImat tt'ausfer rat_s and
the effects of l_quld pool fires surround#.ng a. intact fuselage.
5.1 ,_xall T.nternal Leak Results _ Scenario I
For the small Interual fuel leaks of Sconarlo I, leakage is assumed to
occur from the fuel tanks or fuel llnos into fuselage or wing compartments
within thu aircraft. The leaks might b_ due to cracks duveloplug in welds or
Joints of the fuel system, and they could develop either in flight or on the
ground. These small fuel leaks will then vaporize in the structural compart-
mental and may create a combustible fuel. vapor/elf mixture throughout the
compartment° If an ignition source were preseut;, an explosion could result
,'hat wou_d sew;rely damage the aircraft.
Runulng a purge air flow through compartments critical for fuel leaks
and/or Ignition sources is a way to reduce the fire and explosion hazard.
The purge air flowratu is set so that the fuel vapor/elf mixture is maintained
below the lower combustible limit of the fuel. Hence, only a small region
n_.ar the liquid fucl will be combustible, with an adequate purge air flow
through the compartment. Normally, fuselage or wing compartments which are
susccptable to fue1_ leaks have drains holes at their bottoms to allow any
nonevaporuted liquid fuel to dralu from the compartment,
The llquld _uol spil) rates which were sstabl_shed for consld_rat_on in
Scenario I for LH2 spills are tabulated below:
B8
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i
IA _ 1.0 x I() _ kg/a
_t IB - l,fl x 10 _ kg/M
It', - 1,0 x lO"2 kp,/_
Th¢,(_¢ aaluq ._(dl l_-qd_tg¢ v(_¢'e_ w¢'r(, alto(, u_cd 'or tlw (_I:hor 1u¢,I¢_ (I,CII6 ) ,]I)-4it|l¢[ ,]¢'L A) ILlIIllyZ_(| ill this _¢:udy,
t
'_'ht_ pI|r}_P Ill I._ f _ t)U I:0(IIII YP|II¢_utH fDY _hi) llI)ll_.! flU)] ].oak_._t, rilt_Hq uerP
t!oilll_ttted llRit)}), tht; I)%%i'}))t' _%_I' |llode] |))'tq¢_llL'_d 'Lll _(.W_1011 4.'._,. Th.IH Illt_d_'l
atlstlUlt'tl that all the t'ucl, l.eakagc, v(q,or:l.z_a, aud c.Oillpttt_, au a;h' f,low thai
w£Jl. ill/ltlll;IlJII t'.h¢_ fue',l wq)ol: iiiolq fl;ll¢![.:[Oll) yl!lt, ll) Ill: (lr 1)eh)w the illlilJlllUlll
colt|bttt;t_l)lq ltlltit ill nlc)t)t ol! tht, ¢!Ollq_llrt'tltt!ilt: volu111¢_, 'l'ht! ).,¢.,t!tt_t.; of tlt:lt_
anulytit_) for the fottr fttu_tt) are (4howl! Oil table 18) whe;-e t:he (tir flowvnle
to fuel leakage rata raLiu 18 cOral)Uteri to kt_¢_l) tllt). ¢'olIlp:/r_llle|l£ vt)hlll),.! J.ll 0))
nett-ceutbust ihle )Itato.
For small-scala leaks of the hell.hit ..I .¢)$,¢._II_ fu,_h-) 'he oat_t_),peict_ or
i-- complete fuel cvoporation _s good) atld the _:oml)uted fLowrat_ r¢itio wilt ._e
ueeded to obtain a nonceml)uutibi.e mixture, l.'er ey;aml)l% _c,r LH2, _: fuet
leakage rate in the rauge of 10 -4 to 10 "2 kg./,_ wou.td reqttJ)'e a purge at r flow-
_, rate in the range of 3.45 x 10 -2 to 3,65 kg,% re_.._eeti_¢.ly, _.o obtaiu _) sr.fe
8as mixture. For the conventional fuela) ctle gitaetion _s'more complex) since
fuel Val)erlzatlen can otlly eccur by dlrf_',iotl_n_e the nit stream. The. liquid
_uel may or may not =omplqtely qapor_ze. I_ i_ a _on_piu_.p_,.'blem_o ulla-
lyze) Involviug liquid a_.-_as and f,low grto_etr?:)vapt:r erd air p_oss_tes,
t_mperature, and vapor qlsseldlf_usion ;lifo the air flow, T.. table 18 air,-
m_
_o-fuel flow ratlos for th,.'eot:,,ent:_'..aal fuel3 a)'e eenserv'atlve since it _s
assumed that all.o;" the fuel let,k vaporizes. For either JP-4 ,,)rJet A leakY.ng
at a fh)wrate ef 1,0 _ 20.2 k_./s, all air fltwrnte of about 0,29 kg/s will
yield a not_eed:_bustibl_ gas mint;are Ip the compartment,
FDr t|l¢_ low _tal)ofpi'eeslire)netlvola_.ileftlfi_',a certai1_ temperature
must be present [',fete a eolttbt_stiblevapor/air mixtu,¢ can exist, e_nm w_t'h
no air flew, _#r Jet A (ket'uslne) "llporJzlug into a c,ne atmosphere a_'_:
pr-asure, o _emper_.'-ur,."of :'311 J K (tOO'F) .% required for a combustible
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TABLE 18. - AIR FLOW TO FUEl. IJ_AKAO,I'; I,_ATIOS ],'f)l_ NoNo-CO._flHI.q-r[I_IJ: (,ASES
L':2 .... LC!'.... J".:4............ ....... rMF' MolflCtliorWt, 2,016 16.04 132 1fib
Ydlill,Noo.Comtlustiblo ' 0.(_4 ' 0,05 ' O,OOB ' 0,006
MOlDFraction
_17_'AirToFLzoIFlowRatio _345, _ _4.3 ' 27.24 ' 28,G
i -- FromSection4.3:
Ymio
where
MA = MolecularWeightof Air =28,97gigmQle
b,,,
vapor/air mixture wiLh FZO.O06, To obtain a combustible mixture wlth the
more volatile JP-4 (gasoline) in sea level air, a lower temperature of >-237.8 K
(-32°F) would yield the combustible mole fractions yz0.008. Hence, for the
less volatile conventional fuels, the temperature and air pressure may deter-.
mine if an air purge flow is required for a compartment.
In conclusion, the purge air requirem nts for a bn lin}; cryog c fuel
an compartment are more severe a con-
leak in aircraft than for less volatile
ventiotlal f_el. The purge air requirements for I,}[2 arc an order of ma_nltudo
I_ higher than for the same I,CI[4 leakage rate. Tile conveutiotlal feels evaporate
} by diffusion, and purge air may not be necessary to maintain a noncombustible
r
} mixture if the fuel vapor pressure is low enough. 1'_venif the conventional
fuel leak completely vaporized, tileair purge rate is l_ss for tileh:[l'_her
molecular weight conventional fuels. Hence, the problems of fuel leaks Jntn
aircraft compartments are more severe with tltecryogettic fuels, but they
should be relatively safe wlLh purge air flows which are reasonably obtainable.
9O
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5.2 Liquid Spill, Spreading, and V_porization Resu]ts for
Scenarios 2, 3 and 4
5.2.1 Scenario 2 - Radial spills. In tileScenario 2 epJ1]s, liquid flows
from either a f,el tank or fuel line onto a fixed position on illsbase surface,
resulting in a radial liquid spread. The liquid hydro_en (Ln2) spills were
supplied from a single 12,600 ks capacity tank. Three represeutatlvc Scenario 2
spill rates wore specified, as tabulated below:
2A - 0.5 kg/sj llne leak due to gravity flow.
2B - 2.3 kg/s, llne leak due to pumped flow.
_ 2C - 900 kg/s, leak due to tank puncture.
Both the Scenario 2A and 2B leakage rates are small; hence these leaks appear
continuous with spill times >i.0 hour unless appropriate shut-off valves are
closed by the flight crow. The Scenario 2C spill occurs over a 14-second ti_ae
span, and this may approach an instantaneous spill depending on the liquid
spread and vaporization time.
In thls study, the liquid methane (LCH4) tank loadings and spill rates
were taken as 2.7 times those given for LH2 above. For the conventional fuels
(JP-4 and Jet A), the tank loadings and spill rates were fixed at 3.3 times
those chosen for LH2. Hence, the spill times are the same for all of the
fuels considered in thls Scenario, which effectively compares fuel leaks
based upon the same degree of damage for each of the fuels considered.
For the Scenario 2 spills, the maximum radius of spxoad, rm; the earliest
tlme of the maximum spread, tm; and the maximum rate of liquid evaporation,
_EVAP' were all calculated based upon the Fay models for radial spread pre-
sented near the end of Section 4.1. Usually, an iteratlve solution of these
three parameters is required, to match the liquid evaporation rate to the
average of a variable heat flux occurring to the liquid pool. In this case,
the Scenario 2A and 2B cases were computed using the continuous radial spill
equations while Scenario 2C was solved using the instantaneous radial spill
relations of the Fay model.
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Two _pil] spreading, and vaporizati(m conditions were considered in this
and _be romaiuin_ _conar_n_. The f_.rst condition considered was oil:lint
boiling vapor_zation due to boat transfer from the base surface f_r the
cryogenic ].iqtlids, or constant temperature vaporization controlled by vapor
diffusion into tim atmosphere for the conventional fuels. No burning was
assumed to occur above tlm liquid p._ol for this condition; hence, the extent
of spread and the fuel vaporization rates computed here formed tim input data
for the Vapor Dispersion Models presented in Section 4.2. For this and the
remaining Scenarios, concrete was chosen as the spill surface, with a sea
_. level atmosphere pressure at 297 K (75OF) temperature and a 2 m/e wind con-
dition. For the cryogenic liquids, a variable heat flux was considered from
the base surface, while the vaporlzaton rate of the conventional fuels was
considered constant, based upon a large scale 100 meter liquid spread with a
2 m/s wind blowing over it.
The second condition considered was the spill, spreading and vaporization
of the liquid fuels with pool burning occurring above the liquid spread, With
ignition at the start of the spill, radiatlon.from the flames would be the
major source of heat to a large-scale liquid fuel pool. Table 19 shows the
II
radiant heat flux qF expected to large-scale spills and the rate of liquid
drop YE !us he boiling at tbis heat flux for the various fuels considered.
These data are based upon the flame temperatures TF end the flame emissivities
cF presented by the A. D. Little, Inc. representatives at the oral presentations
held at NASA-Lewls on September 2, 1981. For the cryogenic liquids, this ver-
tically downward radiant heat flux for the equilibrium flame temperature would
be completely absorbed by the liquid or base surface, and would result in
vaporization of these boiling liquids. For the conventional fuels, this radl-
ant heat flux would first increase the liquid temperature, which would also
transfer heat to the base surface, and finally the boiling temperature would
be reached. A detailed transient mass and |teat flow analysis would be required
to estimate the time and extent of the conventional fuel spreads with pool
burning above them. Hence, these calculations were only made for the spreading
of the cryogenic boiling liquids with pool burning flames above.
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TABLE 19. | _I.(._LD RmnANT III,'.AT FI,UX FROM VARIOUS T'_r^_r"s
fuel K F kW/lll_ Ili/R ,
Ltl2 1700, 0.4 109.4 6,0x 10.3
LCH4 lli00, 0,0 229.6 1,1x 10.3
I
i JP.4 1100. 0,0 74.7 2,0 x 10.4
JetA 1100. 0,9 74.7 2,6 x 10"4
NOTE'. lho temperatureTFandemissivity_Fof theseflamesarebasedupontheA.D. Little.Ioc.combustion
imalysisprese.tedattheNASA-Lewisoralpreze,tetio,%Sept2. 1981,
; The results of the spreading and vaporization solutions with no burning
i are shown on table 20. For the cryogenic liquids, the radius r and time t
m m
to evaporate the LH2 spills are less than those for LCH 4. Vaporization of
the conventional fuels requires much larger radii and times, although the
more volatile JP-4 (gasoline) is considerably faster _han the less volatile
Jet A (kerosine) fuel. Scenarios 2A and 2B, which used the continuous radial
spill model, show the same rate of vaporization as the spill rate _. Sce-
nario 2C, which uses the instantaneous radial spill equations, shows a lower
maximum vaporization rate than the spill rate which occurred during the
14 second spill duration.
Table 21 shows the results of spreading and vaporization solutions for
the cryogenic fuels with pool burning flames above. Once again, the extent
and times of the LH2 spills are less than those _or LCH4, especially for the
larger rate Scenario 2C spill. Comparing these solutions with flames to
those without flames, table 20 shows that burning decreases the radius and
time of the spread, while inc':easing the maximum rate of vaporization for
the instantaneous Scenario 2C spill.
Hence, for the range of radial spills considered here, the cryogenic
liquids would evaporate much faster, with less radial spread, than the con-
ventlonal fuels. Comparing the hlgh rate Scenario 2C spills with no flames,
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TABI,F. 20. - S[',I':NAR_O 2_ I_All_AL S[£LLp ._PllE,AI)IN_I AND
V_I_IIRIZATTON, NO 1,'I,AHE.q.
Scu,orto m th (]0 fin VC rm lfn mEVAP
No.,F,ol kQ ku/lec m3 m31zoc toilet m zoc k_/soc
2A, kti2 12,000 0.5 117.0 0.0071 2.5x 10.3 1.0 1.0 0,5
I 20, LH2 12,600 2.3 117.8 0.0324 2,5 x 10.3 2.0 3.0 2.3
2C,LH2 12,600 900 117.8 12.70 2.5 x 10.3 35 32 630
2A, LCH4 34,398 1.37 81.13 0.0032 6.0 x 10.4 1.3 3,6 1,37
_" 2B,LCH4 34,398 6.28 81.13 0,0148 4.0x 10.4 3.4 0.0 6,28
2C,LCH4 31,396 2,457 81.13 6.795 1.1x 10.4 61 117 550
2A,JP.4 42,210 1.68 54.12 0.0021 2.0 x 10.0 10.6 143 1.68
28, JP.4 42,210 7.71 54.12 0.0099 2.0x 10.6 40 237 7,71
2C,JP.4 4_,210 3,015 64.12 3.865 2,0x 10.6 14;?, 705 IO0
2A,JetA 42,210 1.05 54.12 0,0021 7.0x 10.8 69 1,330 1.66
20, JetA 42,210 731 54.12 0.0099 7.0x 10.6 212 2,220 7.71
2C,JetA 42,210 3,015 4,180 18,0
7.0x 10854,12 i 3.865 331
the LH2 would completely vaporize in 32 seconds, compared to an LCII_ vapori-
zation time of =117 seconds, _aile tile maximum hydrogen radius is approxi-
merely half that for methane. Burning above these cryogenic fuels decreases
both the radii and times of the spills by comparable ratios for both 1,1t2 and
LCtl4. The noburning vaporization times of the conventional fuels may seem
short, but it should be remembered that these models have a completely flat
surface, with no small-scale liquid pools. Although we did not so_ve spread-
ing of the conventional fuel.q with flames above, a burning Jet h, Scenario 2C
spill might last for approxiraately a_l hour based ou aircraft crash experieuce,
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TABLE 21. - _CENARIO 2_ RAI_IAL SPILI,, SPREADING ._NI)
VAPORIZATI (}N, ....... ABOI_
8¢0narlo m _ .r, _O VE rm I tm ,i,pvAp
NO,,Fuel kfJ k/Ioc m,_ m3/soc m/see m I Ioc Km,.,,.;
2A, LH2 12,800 0.5 117,0 0.0071 0.0 x 10.3 0.0 J 1.0 0.5
20, LH2 12,600 2.3 117,8 0.0324 0,0x 10"3 1.3 [ 1.7 2.3
2C,LH2 12,600 900 117,6 12,70 0,0x 10.3 26 I 15 900
2A,LCH4 34,398 1.37 81.13 0.0032 1.1x 10.3 1.0 ] 2.5 1.37I
26, LCH4 34,399 6.28 01,13 0.0140 1.1x 10'3 2.1 I 4.1 6.20
2C,LCH4 34,396 2,457 81.13 5.795 1,1x 10.3 39 I 38 1,710
The largest Jet A aircraft spill (the Tenerife crash of two fully tanked 747a
on March 27, 1977) burned for more than lO hours.
5.2.2 Scenario 3 - Axial spills. - For the Scenarlo 3 spills, liquid flows
I from either a fuel tank or fuel line onto the base surface while the aircraft
decelerates from a velocity of 61.7 m/s (120 knots) along the spill line.
The tank loadings and leakage rates are exactly the same as those used for
the Scenario 2 spills. The axial spread considered was a one-dlmenslonal
spread perpendicular to the spill llne. With the high aircraft velocity,
VA, a constant rate of spill will yield a near instantaneous spill of 0'o i
(volume per unit length of spill line) at a fixed position along the spill !
llne. Neglecting the velocity along the spill line, thls instaptaneous spill
will then create a unit width spread, out perpendicular from both sides of 1
the spill centerllne. In this model, the axial d_stance 0 x, will be half the
full spread distance, measured perpendicularly from the spl21 center llne to
one edge of the axial spread. Based upon the Fay model equations for
instantaneous axial spills presented In Section 4.], the maximum axial half-
spread distance, Xm; the earliest tlme of the maximum spresdt tm; anJ the
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mnxtmum rat_ nf evaporation per nntt width of spresd, girl,yAp wero ca]cnlatt_d.
Tim same m,-_tlm,ls of solution aml both t:he burn:]n_¢ and nen-ln*rntng c.nd_ttmm
i were computed for the ,','tenable 3 spills, as was done for Scenario 2, For
-_ccuario 3, only an inu_antancous axial spill mode], was required, aonsidcriug
the aircraft veloc±ty.The results of tim axial spreading and vapnrization snlutions with no
burning are shown on table 22, while those with pool burning above tim ],_quJd
spread are g_ven in table 23. $t should be noticed that the low spill rate_
of Scenarios 3h and qB yield very short axial spreads, xm. Considering the
hlgh aircraft velocity, Vh - 61.7 m/s, the liquid would actually spray upon
IK falling and/or striking tim spill surface. This would tend to increase tlm
extent of the spread and decrease the time to complete evaporation compared
to those values presented in the tables. This instantaneous axial spreadD
model best simulates the high spill rate cases, such as Scenario 3C, where the
one-dlmenslonal axial spread extends for a considerable distance.
_1 Generally speaking, tile same observations made for tim Scenario 2 spill
data pertains here. The extent and time of the maximum spreads increase in
this order: LH2, LCH4, 2P-4 and Jet A, the order of decreasing volatility.it
D As expected, flames above the liquid spill decrease the time and extent of
the vaporlzatioll, whi.*h occurs at an increased rate.
In conclusion, a fuel spill from a moving aircraft distributes the liquid
along a long spill llne. The spread perpendicular to this llne is then
_" shorter in dlstancc and time than for a fixed location radial spill. For
eyample, the Scenario 3C, LII2 spill with no flame extends 864 meters down and
6.2 meters on each side of tlle spill llne, with the aircraft moving 61.7 m/s.
The total time of spill along tile spill ]Jne length is 14 seconds, while the
evaporation time at any point along tilespill llne is =13 seconds. In com-
parlsen, the Scenario 2C, 1,112radial spill with no burning, had a maximum
radial spread of 35 meters and required =32 seconds to evaporate, llence, the
aircraft motion in tileaxial spills increases the surface area of the spread,
which substantially decreases the time required for evaporation at ally loca-
tion along the spl]] line.
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TABLE 22. - AXiAl, ,_P[LL, 5PREADTNC AND VAPOI_TZA'I'[ON,N_) I,'LAIqI'_5
8cun_rin m _ On O_ VE Xm tm ii_VAlJ
No.,F.ol ku kg/s_c .13 m3/m m/sac m soc kw/ms,c
3A,LIt2 12,600 0.5 117.8 1,14x10'4 2.6 x 10"3 0,07 0,7 0,025
30, LtI2 12,600 2,3 117,8 5.20X 10.4 2,5 x 10.3 0.17 1,3 0,061
3C,LIt2 12,600 900 117.9 0.2056 2,5 x 10.3 6.2 12.9 ! 2.21
3A,LCH4 34,390 1,37 81.13 5,22x 10.5 1.0x10.3 0,06 0.8 0,064
_j 30, Li;H4 34,390 6.28 81.13 2.40x10.4 1.0x 10.3 0.16 1,5 0.134
30, LCH4 34,398 2,457 81,13 0,0939 2.3x 10.4 10 41 1.95
3A,JF4 42,210 1.60 64.12 3.48x 10.6 2.0x 10.6 0.6 29 0,0018
30,JP.4 42,210 7.71 54.12 1.60x 10.4 2.0x !0.9 1,5 53 0.0046
3C,JP-4 42,210 3,015 54,12 0.0626 2.0 x10.6 03 560 0.165
3A,JetA 42,210 1.68 54,12 3.48x 10"6 7.0 x 10.8 2.3 217 0.00025
30, JetA 42.210 7.71 54,12 1.60x 10.4 7.0x 10.8 5.0 400 0.00062
3C,JetA 42,210 3,015 54.12 0.0626 7.0x 10.8 203 4,330 0.0221Initialaircraftvelocityalongtl esp'llline,VA= 61.7bm/sac(1 0knots)
P
5.2.3 Scenario 4 - Radial spills, catastrophic crash. = The Scenario 4
I spills are the result of a nonsurvivable crash of the aircraft, in which all
of the tanks rupture and spill instantaneously, resulting in an assumed radis)I
spreading and vaporization of the liquid fuel. Scenario 4A represents a
crash shortly after takeoff, where the nearly full tank loadings would be
spilled instantaneously, while Scenario 4B simulates a crash Just before
]andingj with an instantaneous spill of _10_ of the total tank capacity.
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TAIti,I': 2_. - AXIAI, ,_PlLI., _IGIEAIIINfl ANll 7APlflH P,A'llil,_ FLA;,II'.fi Alli)VI",
.llCellUIiC III lil Jill [li' I Vlr X III IIII lll'liVAII
Nil,, hell kll kll/lei; III *_ 11131111 III11t1!1', III III1: kli/lllllll:
3A, LIt2 12,000 0.5 111,0 1.14x 10'4 ll,0 x 10,3 0,05 ll,4 II,IM7
91_,tit l 12,000 7,3 117.0 b,20x 10'4 11,0x 10.3 0,17 il,'/ 0,104
30, LH2 12,000 900 117.0 0,205_ 0.0 x 103 4,4 73 !.74
3A,LCtt4 34,396 1.37 81.13 5.22x 10.5 1.1x 10.3 0.00 0.8 0.005
_" 30, LCH4 34,398 I 6.28 81.13 2,40x 10.4 1.1x 103 0.10 1.4 0,137
I
3C,LCH4 34,398 J_ 2,457 81,13 0.0939 1.1x 10.3 5,5 10. 4.94
I,itiol aircraftvelocityaloogthespillline.VA _,81.73m/see(120koots).
The total fuel sp]]]a[;e for 4A for LII2 was 22,600 kg. mid the Salll,2weight
ratios as used in Scenarios 2 and 3 were used here for the various fuu]s.
Since all these spills are instantaneous, tileFay mode] equations for
instantaneous radial spills presented near the end of Sectlou 4.1 were used
in thls analysis. The maximum radius of the spread, rm; "hu uarllesL L£1ilu
of the maximum spread, tin; and tilemaximum rate of v.'Ipor]zntlon. _il,VAP, were
i:omput_d for both the conditions of no _lumes ned poo_l burlling flames ab_r,.e
the liquid spreads. These data are presented in table 24 for the nu-i_urn]nl;
condition and in table 25 for the liquid pool bureili I' c,udlt.lon.
()fleeagain, these data show the same rnnk]nll ef the fui_]<,ire,lallve te
the radial extent of the spread and time fer vaperlzat]on as occurred fer
tile Scenario 2 radial spills. ,,Jth no flames, tile maximum Hcennr]o 4A sp]l]s
would find a maximum radius of 49 meters and a vzlporizat]ou tlme of 39 s(,eond::
for LII2, compared to 77 meters and 140 seconds for I.Clt/. W(th flames ;11_¢_v¢.
the liquid spill, a 37-meter maximum red:iotas and a 77 _;l_eend vapertP.atlen time,
is predicted for LII2, compared to 63 meters and 43 se¢'¢mds for 1,C114, when the
maximum Scenario 4A spil] is eonstde.ted. The extent (if spread and time of
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TABLE 24° SCli',NAR[O 4, RAI)IAL flP]T,L_ HPItI,;_])]NG AN])
VAPOI(I:ZATI_ON,NO ILAlql,,_
Scouerls m ii_ UII fl_ VE h. tm fi*l_VAl*
NO,,Fuel kfl k0/so¢ III 3 U] 3/|OC m/|uc Ill IQi: k [_,'|PI_
4A, LH2 21,000 ,,, 36434 .,, 1,9x 10.3 49 39 1,046
49, LH2 2,160 ,,, 30,474 ,,, 2,5 x 10.3 20 19 210
4A, LCH4 50,968 ,,, 139,00 ,, 1,0x 10'4 77 146 799
49, LCH4 5,696 _, 13,909 ,_ 1,5x19'4 29 94 170)
J_ 4A,JP.4 72,366 _ 9237 _ 2.0 x10.6 175 995 150
48, JP.4 7,236 ..J 9,277 ,,_ 2,0x 10.6 74 505 26,9
4A,JetA 72,360 _ 9237 _ 7.0x 10"9 406 4,790 26,2
40, JetA 7,239 _ 9.277 _ 7,0x 10.8 171 2,690 5,02
I
TABLE 25. - SCENARIO 4D RADIAL SPILLj SPREADING AND
VAPORIZATION p FLAMES ABOVE
Scenerlo m th Qo (10 VE rm tm mEVAP
No,,Fuel kg kg/sec m3 m3/sec m/see m sec kglzec
4A, LH2 21,600 _ 304,74 _ 6.0 x10` 3 22 1,630
4A, LH2 2,160 _ 39,474 _ 6,0 x 10.3 12 330
4A, I-CH4 59,966 _ 139,06 _ 1,1x 10"3 43 2,560
48, LCH4 5,699 _ 13,908 _ 1,1x 10.3 L 24 455
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v. ]
1
v_Ipin'J_atl_nlfar lhv Iici_llarlo/)A _'OtlVOllI:lolllll(t P] sp:l]]t_I_ grv;iter tlmn
fh.i_o ab.vv f.r rhv llO l_]_Illi[' VOlldJllnll,tal)]o '._li) llt|d |'!it |hl_ f]iillie oonilJtIittl)
i w_ipl'[_oxpoi'h,IlOOIdlOWS _lUl'll|:[Iliotlgri>ii|]erIL[)(IIIfill|IOIiYIIH rollroiIotlfatfveiif
,_COtlm'ii}AA "I'11l_ (_t',Tet:A,
Thv show, i)rodlctlot|s nip _O¢,llllrlos 9. throtlgh 4 rq)l]ls h/Iw, idlowH thai:
t:hooxtout of S!IFoIId atilt ['[III(_of val_or'll;nt,_ottI_IIf|ash]usi¢ for I_he ¢!ry(igt_u_L'
lhs:,l.;_t|iiiiil_l__ t',n%iv(.,ntl,o lI] fuolli) _n _)ot_l t|u.',l)%wn_n}_and Iio bur_Inp, m)n-
dlth)u, (:oml)arhlg I:Ite cryofi_tl:I.¢! fuels) t:ho _xt(.,at of the! _l)resd for l,ll2 can
bu down to half as far) whlle the evaporaL_on t;hne can bc ont_-fc)urtlI f_o otle-
half tlmt of I.C,II4. llen(:e) from the statldl)o'[llt of tll:l.nJtliUttl liquid spread and
fast eval)oratJ.on ) ]Aqnfd Itydrogen it) tile safest fuel) l)rcsentlug _east hazard
to the surrouud:hw,.s in event of a crash,
5.3 Gaseous Disl)ersion Results _or Scenarios 2. 3 and
A coml)lt, t_, ]Jurist of tlle gaseous dispersion results (for LII2, LClt4. and
,]P-I¢ [uel_i) _or Scenarios 2) 3) and 4 is given in A|)p_ndix h. A sutmllary Cf tile
results Is presented in table 26. The significance of tlle results are din-
cussed in th_u Section.Scenario 2A it) a mnall circular spill. Tile final time, downwind d_stance,
t and height abeve ground are listed for the different fuels in table 26 forcomparison. The listing for the LI[2 case in Apl)eedix A allows that beth the
buoyancy acceleration (column 5)) and vertical speed of tile puff rise from
zern to maxilnum and then decrease. Tim overall angle of ascent is about
30% Tim first entrainment speed (u I in column 10) also increasv_ from
zero to a maximum before decreasing) fo.llow_ng its dependence on the relative
velocity between the puff and the surrounding air. The second cotrsiument
speed (it s iu column it) decrua'_e_ monotonlcall.y after its t.nitial maxi_;_l
because the volume dilution quickly reduces the creation of turbulence by tile
vigorous evaporation rate. The puff radius and thickness increase alono-
tonically as tim puff continually entrains air.
The next two sheets in Appetldix A) a plot at, d listing for the methane
case for Scenario 2A, show the LCII4 puff lasts almost twice as long as the
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TAI_IJ,:20. _ c;A_W.()lfflI)[f_I,j,,,I{,_IION,_H]/_.IiYl.'Oll_(_I,'.NAIH_],_;, 3AN ) 4
IlUWilwhlll Iluillhi
I:liliil lllilll Illllfllllltl Ahlivlilifuuliil
_Ciliillrili I:illil Illi_lilill,,l) (lillilllrll) (lllllltii'l)
............ .ll. .....................
2A I.II2 30 51 2(I
2A L_II4 54 42
2A JP4 206 03 0.05
20 LIt2 42 90 52
30 LCIf4 122 03 11
_.. 20 Jll.4 942(1GnlJll) 397 O,OO
2C LH2 140 411 570
2C LCII4 1,624(27mi,) 713 72
2C JP.4 11.736(3,26hr) G,816 0.09i.
3A LH2 10 21 7
3A LCll4 11 10 I
3A JP.4 412 321 0,23
30 LH2 21 31 12
38 LCH4 20 18 2
30 JP-4 _,'16(9 Illill) 420 0,23
3C LH2 30 47 23
3C LCH4 40 21 I
3C JP.4 216 142 0.14
4A LH2 173 512 702
4A LCli4 1,998(33Inin) 05 i
4A JP.4 17,318(4,6hr) 10.4knl 63
40 LH2 119 320 399
4_ LCH4 831(14minl 404 45
48 JP-4 3,211(54mlnl 1.6km 0.07
IOI
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I_yd):o_,n v_lse had trnve]_ ,q]otlg tho Rr_st]d |'(_r tllllS{: IH_ _th ]J|'eL'lltle, At_
O|l_r_'tl||ll]Otlt ¢!Oll_hsleti_ [|iO [lli|[i|N.] I|O_.%a|'_ve htlO_il_}Py I)o¢!oli_*!s Ill I_hl:]v Im4_ltlve
l|l_{I ]_fLH _lp.' ptl_| _ a |L,W Illl}_¢-_l'H {_f_ tho _roHlld, Tho ] [f_t':,l_. _, Hhl_wli _JOW
_-_rltVLt:IIlIIIOIIL:dOr,H I}(It: ovl.!t|r I:llr(io_h tJie hottnlll tJf the, puff wh¢_lt I I_ Lravo]tt
Ll]_{ln_ tho _rDatld, Tho _,_Ller,'_'l_beh_'tvier of aHe(_nd:lll} J, h.vdro_e_.l ]lqld'|'t4 and _rolahl-.
.Lovel tlTav{.,1 (]J_ lil_thatIo. IHlff_4 i_rt, di{_tL_d h_ _ho iiiode:l :h_ f_ulq_orted hy Lhe
liquid hydrogee te_n clmductod at _t±te Stlndu (]3) and tl|d liqtt:hl natural
gas tests couduet:ed at China Lake (14).
Tlle next plot and listing _Lu Appendix A show how the ,W-4 in Feca,_'_o 2A
_" never r_ees off the ground because of its neF, atlve, buoyancy. ]it travcl,l
slowly for a long time because it hugs tlm ground wlmre the wind speed _
very imp. l'n fact, the power law wind profile reqldre_ that ;'I":vlnd speed
go to zero right at ilia surface, a houndary condition _,:-,']3>' ,r.po_ed _n all
fluid flow models that have frictieu at tile weals, _.,ere is also no contri-
bution to entrainment from the seco.'id term because it is computed only .it
there is a vigorous evaporation rate. There is no mixing of air thro-tgh tha
bottom surface because, the JP-4 hugs the ground in stable air. The second
llne for time equal to 1 second in the Appendix A listing for JP-4 shows a
slight decrease in the puff radius and half thickness before these pelf
dimensions monotonically increase, Tile initial decrease is not tea], but
results from computational error in tlleprogram. This error is stool] enough
to neglect in assessing the model results,
Ther_ are no plots or listings for asp Jet A cases because no flammable
concentration is over produced when the surface temperature is 294 K (70°F),
Only if tilesurface temperature is increased to at least 314 to 322 K (I05 -
120°F) cau a flanmmblc conceutration be produced from tile increased ewH)ora--
tion tale.
Tile te.'_tllts for Scenario 2B (for hydrogen) tn Al)pettdix A show liow a
bigger sp_ll increases the trajectory t:lme, dtmens]tms (alsn _ee tab]e :!6)_
end ascent angle, Tile Jl'_-4 pt_ff for Scenario 2B _a,st,q :6 minutt_,H _t!_ it: hits::,
the ground and slowly moves almost 400 meters.
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'J.'he.Hcnnario 2C for hydrogc_l shown the puff mevJ,tg 575 meters above
ground dur_llg a downwind travel of 4]] ,let_ra. In comparison, the Illel:hflllo
in Sccuario 2C trave]n a]nng she gratmd 7].3 mcter_ and _;or.an't _,,t off l:ht_
grouted nxcnpt hriuf].y Just b_forc it di].utos to its lowest flammable eone_n ,_
1rot'ion, _1| the ].isLing for this case in Appendix A ch_,',aseenL angle of 05 °
aL the cnc aeeend tima result_ from the verglca] cxpm_s'hu_of the puff bc_fnre
it starts moving downwind.
_'ha JP-4 case fur Sc_narlo 2C shows f'haL vapur from a large (1.43In radius)
upill o£ convenrloual fuel can _heorctleally move a long dlstaueu (6.8 _dll)
dowuwiud close _o the ground far a long time (over 3 hours). In reality, the
JP-.4vapor would disperse morn quickly when it moved off the downwind end of
the runway, which probably won't be louger than about 4 km (13,126 feet).
On an airport the trajectory of the flammable gaseous fuels in all eases
would move towards incoming aircraft. Safety considerations would dictate
_hat measures must be taken to prevent any alrcraft from flying, or trying to
land, _hrough a cloud (mauy puffs) of any fie.rulable gaseous fuel.
For the axial geometry Scenarios 3A, 3B, and 3C, the model follows a puff
emanating from a spill of i meter unit axial length. The spill rates in
Scenarios 3A and 3B are small enough to allow an aircraft to spill fuel over
the entire length of runway. This might amount to 4000 unit spills, each
starting with a l-meter length, following each other downwind. In addition,
for each unit length of spill there will be puffs that precede and follow
thls largest puff being tracked by the model.
Data for the hydrogen case for Scenario 4A in Appendix A shows the
flammable puff moving off the ground in 20 seconds after spreading to 54.2 m
radius. It persists for 173 see. and during that time rises to 782 meters
above ground before being diluted tc less than 4 percent hydrogen. The rapid
rise rate means the vapor cloud from a hydrogen spill will not endanger
persons or property in the surrounding area in event of a catastrophic crash
of a Lil2 fueled airplane. On the other hand, the methane in Scenario 4A
moves along the ground for more than one-half hour to cover 851 meters, and
it only rises off the ground during the last I to 2 minutes. The Jl'-4gas
puff could theoretically move 10.4 km downwind along the ground in almost
I03
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hours, llewevcr, afte, r 4 km at most, _t would move off tile cud t_f _ho ruuway '1
onto grass, watt, r, et_. 'l'herefore, th¢_bt3u_dary c_ndlt;l_n_ wi]l probably ]
¢1|l_||g_3 (]l?lllllat:|ca]Jy m invalidating the_l¢_ vollq_.ted dtfltanees ;aid tr_lv¢,l tiros.
Ilawevug', th_ |]ol2t_e£_[¢tlex:Lsls J!or tile fJ.Ctllllllab]o J_4 t_loud to iiIOV_ off al_|}or[; I
l)rel.._rty onto th_ lalld uf other _wavrs.
[ Plots of tilemeveme_lt slid size of tile puffs for each of th_ fuels are
prep|calledin flguroa 18 and 19. l.'Igure18 uhowa altitude versus drift dis-
' lance with indications of elapsed time marked on the path of each of thei
fuelu. Figure 19 illuntrates tile growth of the puff diameter as a function
of time for all three fuel_.
The hydrogen case for Scenario 4A was also run with each atmospheric
stability class. As sho_l in table 27, from data in Appendix A, the puff
rose least and traveled furthest downwind in tile least time with stability
Classes 3 and 4 (C and 1)). The wind iq_eed was at the maximum 5 m/s for both
classes and -_ts effect probably outweighed the effect of temperature profile,
determiued by tile l._pee rate.
The effect of relati_._ humidity on the Scenario 4A LII2 spill can be
seen in tilebottom part of table 27. More water vapor reduces the traveltime and downwind distance monotonically but the maximum height is achieved
i by a puff rising through air with 50% relative humidity.
5.4 Heat Transfer to the Passenger Cabin I
Consider an aircraft crash wlth a fuel spill beneath and flames around
) the fuselage, but with an intact and closed passenKer cabin. For the various
fuels considered ill this study, what time period would be required for the
flames to breach the cabin, or create a llfe threatening environment for the
passengers in tile cabin? In Sectton 4.4, a tllermal model was described to
compute the transient temperatures throurh the fuselage cabin wall cross
section. The objective of tbis section is to present results of an analysis
Of this t:ab_tl wall model to estimate the survivability time for pessenger_
(aside the fuselage cabin imbedded in the flames of various fuels.
Illorder to compare the various fuels, the |lent absorbed on the fuselage
skin from tileatJacent flames must be estimated. A large scale fuel spill
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t 173 sac
700 --
600 _ t_lu0
r_J Spillquantity (kg)
500 _J t- 120 [] = LH2 21,600
/
/_ ,, LCH4 58,320
i 0 = JP-4 71,280
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300 / t = 90/2O0
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Figure 18. - Altitude vs. drift disLance for flammable puffs of liquid
hydrogen, liquid methane, and JP-4 (Scenario 4A, wind
speed - 2 m/s).
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Figure 19. - Flammable pu£f diameter vs Cime for liquid hydr(,_,en,liquid
methane, and JP-4 (Scenario 4A, wind _p_ed _ 2 m/s).
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TABLE 27. - GASEOUS DISPERSION RESULTS FOB U_FFEIH_NT
ATMOSPIH_E[C STABILTT[E_ AND RELATIVE IUIMI]}I[I_ES
i -
Fuel= Hydrogen.Scenario4A
L Relative FI,ol Dew,wind lteight Wind
i Humidity Time OJlterlce AboveGround Speed
i Stability (%) (sees.de) (meters) {motels) (m/s)6 50 173 612 782 2
b 5 50 t46 580 537 3
4 50 119 703 347 5
_ 3 50 119 702 344 5
I 2 50 153 635 557 3
1 50 186 536 739 2
6 O 267 842 763 2
6 25 222 684 774 2
\
6 50 173 512 782 2
I 6 75 151 431 _}0 2
100 138 357 718 2
6
I was assumed which would result in a large scale pool burning. The fuselageb
was assumed to be directly imbedded in t_:. flames, so that both rad_atlon
i and convection heat transfer occur to the outer surface of the fuselage
skin. The incident radiation heat flux from each of the large scale fuel
flames can be taken from table 1_. The radiation view factor from the
vertical fuselage skin wall to the large scale flames should be _0.5. Al-
though the bare aluminum skin could have a low emissivity, _ O. Ip a painted
akin or one subjected to corrosive flames could have emluslvltyc_0.9, which
was assumed in this analysis. Hence, the absorbed radlavt heat flux on the
fuselage skin q_, is shown on table 28 for the various fuels.
With flames next to the external fuselage skin, turbulent convection
heat transfer will occur from the hot flames. The turbulent convection heat
lO?
TAB]J_.28, -- ABSORBI,_D 1,'U_ELA_ SKIN 1|_AT 1,,,t_X IN Tt1_ VARIOI]_ 1,'1,_E_
te q_t
kW/_.2 kW/m2 kW/nl2 kW/m_'
LH2 189.4 8G.2 31.8 117,0
LCIt4 229.6 103.3 27.2 130.5
JP.4 74.7 33.6 _B.2 51.8
JETA 74.7 33,6 182 51.8
transfer coefficient, h, opposite the vertical fuselage skin wall, is estimated
as h_23 W/m2K (4.0 Btu/hr ft2 OR). Using this heat transfer coefficient,
the convective heat flux, qc' to the skin is shown on tabJe 28 for each of
tile fuels. The estimated maximum heat flux absorbed by the skin, q', was
then obtained by adding the absorbed radiant and convective heat fluxes, which
yields the data in the last column of table 28.
The transient thermal model of the fuselage cabin wall, briefly described
in Section 4.4, was run over a range of absorbed heat fluxes, q", on the
fuselage skin. The solid curves of flg%tre 20 show the outer fuselage wall
temperature as a function of the absorbed heat fluxes labeled on those curves.
Plotted as dashed lines on the same graph is the temperature response to the
estimated maximum absorbed heat flux q" for each of the fuel flames consideredin table 28. The dotted curve at the bottom of this graph shows the inner
cabin wall temperature, which only rises one or two °C (two to four OF) over
thls short time span.
When the aluminum skln and stringer temperatures are in the range of
I 430°C (BoboF) to 480°C (896°F), the fuselage should collapse due to its own
i weight. Tiffs fuselage collapse temperature band is shown in figure 20. Based
upon tilemaximum expect(,_d absorbed heat fluxes from the various flames, the
fuselage should collapse after _40 seconds in a methane flame, and after
~50 seconds in hydrogen flame, and after _120 seconds in a JP-4 or Jet A
flame. The inner cabin wall temperature barely rises over short tlme spans,
and hence this temperature is no threat to human survival.
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Figure 20. - Outer £uselage wall temperature In flemes.
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To _waluato the pas#dMl:lty of resole.go cell.apse :In largo m'.al+, apt 1]
t']alllo_lp I:lto _xpoeted huruhlg ttnle_l fur Saollarto 2{1_ 4A and 41_ radtal tlp:llllt
i' wllh flalli_ql ,qlmv¢_, all given :h| tables 21 and 25 were lnvo;4t|gatod, For 1,112_
th¢_ funol.ago cnllnp_o time 1.5 ,, 50 seconds, much gro.atar tball lzho largest
• pr(_dlet;od burn tlme of 22 sec¢,nda, For LCIIft the futlel.ago aollapfle t:lm¢! It_
_. ,_ 40 Hecotl,ls s which ts comparable to tim ].arRest'. pred:leted burn t:lmc._ of
/#3 seconds, For el.tlmr ,TP-4 or JET AI rhc fuselage collapse timq of
_-120 seconds Is much l,esa than _he expected conventional fuels burn tlmes
of approxinmtely all hour. Ilence, based upon this study of large scale fire_,
D
the fuselage structure should 8urviv, _ a hydrogen fire, be marginal, for col-,
re,f-
lapse in a methane fire, and should definitely collapse in JP-4 or JET h
fire about the fuselage,
Although a thermal analysis was not done on the cabin windows, a few
observations should be made. A good fraction of the high radiant heat flux
from tlm flames would be transferred through the plastic windows, say ~50 kW/m 2.
Since a radiant heat flux of _-i0 kW/m 2 can cause skin burn within a few seconds
exposure, the passengers would appear to be at risk to radiation burns through
the windows, especially with the cryogenic fuel fires. Although the thernm]
i capacity of window panes appears to be similar to that of the fuselage wall
cross-sectlon and only a fraction of the radiant heating will be absorbed by
the window panes, the softening temperature of these plastic window panes
should be in the range of 90°C (193°F) to 150°C (302°F). This low structural
failure temperature of the window pane nmterlals may mean that flames would
breach the window panes before the fuselage would collapse, llcncc, because of
the possibilities of radiation skin burns through the window paues and struc-
tural collapse due to the low softening temperature of the plastic window
panes, a transient thermal and radiation analysis should be done on the cabin
windows and means of alleviating the high heat flux (such as reflective coat-
Ing8 on the outside surfaces of the wludow panes) iavm_tigated.
ii0
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Couc, lus_ou,_ reached as a rusul£ of this tt'ash fire haz;trd _tudy _)f wirlou,.'
aircraft _uuls are as £ullows:
i. Cryogenic fuels will bu c_:rricd ia fuselage taaks which i.hut'cL:Lly
are more ruslstauL to daumgc than is _he rust of the fuselage.
2, Fuselage Lauks for cryogculc fuels at,' loss susceptible to damage
which would result illspilled fuel than are tanks for COL*VCLltiullal
fuels which arc Iocat'ed iu tllewills•
3. Tacks of coaventloually-fueled aircra£t arc veered to the atmosphere;
therefore a combustible mixture can exist inside the tanks. Cryogenic
fuel tanks are pressurized with gaseous fuel. No oxygen is prcs_l_t
withla the tanks so _here is flu flr¢ or explusioe hazard. This
repc-sents added safety fur cryogenic fuels.
4. The extent of spreading of the liquid fuels, and the time required for
them to vaporize, varies inversely with the volatility of the various
fuels. Ranking the fuels in the order of increasing vaporization timeand extent of spread, for conditions both with and without flames above
i the pools, yields the following order: L||2, LCH4. JP-4, JET A.
5. The probability of fire in event of u survivable crash whore fuel is
spilled is quite high (greater than 80%), regardless of the type of
fuel i_tvolved,
6. The ground level Imzard tu the aurrouuding cuml_tuuityrepress:trod by
spilled hydrogen in eveut of a crash where fire does not i,u.udiatcly
result is dissipated within about 40 seconds in tlteworst case
analyzed. Since a flammable cloud rises to a height of about 800 m,
it poses a threat to low flying aircraft for a few minutes, With
I LCH 4 the ground level hazard would persist for mere than ha]f at, hour
and the flammable cloud would be bloom 851 m before it is dissipated.
It therefore poses a substcvtlal threat to people, vehicles, and
structures on the ground ir this area. The cloud of flare,rublevapor
from the corresponding JP-4 spill never leaves the ground, persists
for 4.8 hours, and theoretically could drift 10.4 kin. Jet A and JP-4
vaporize by diffusion at the normal ambient temperature condition
analyzed; however, Jet A does not have a high enough vapor pressure
to form a combustible mixture at standard stmospheric conditions.
lit
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/. A I"J.r,_, r_f;o]L:llih' from ertish of it J,ll2,-hie]pd ;tir_ra|t. w| 11 I)(, v(_ry
8nlltll _11 II|?INI_lil(lSll(l_L I11 (hlr: 'ell POllll)ari)dtl) #)Lit[,)"fill!Is.
Piltllll'll_l_|?flIII l,ll,)alr(_r_dl _t)l l),Ol)#dHy b._Ll _un'_Iv(, ;t vrmd) I 1)'i'liy
HLayillg IU tlleJr'tl_,tlL_latilt] |iI('fl.l'(,liorll_;(lilt(h'tHl thall ]l) tli'i'(illilt;
fur t:lll.! wOrHL (_;llle I_tudl.(_d). Wl, th tilt Llle o[,ll_,r fur, It; _t J Jr(, WUllJ.d
r_qul,ri! J,mllU!dl.a[,(_[!VIICUIiI_OIInl_' Lli(_J!ose]agl'.
14. Liquld drtlill llulellaltd pttr|_l!ltir I!]OW will r(,duc(! tlm hill/it'dU[ flt'._;
¢.aas_d by t_lilall ftlc',l leaks inl_o airl_lhqft cOilllia|_'ttllmlts [(ll" I)t)Lh uhu
ory()}{(_lll{', llitl[ _,!UlIVI21LL_InIi;ll [llell],
_. _onvcn_iottal gausniau dispersloo models canltot be tined It} l)redleLthe
time/_paoe dyttalltlcs of gllStlOU8 hydroge.n attd methane origtnttting from
_-, cryogenic liquids which dinlterne sometimes tit i._s tltatl one i!liunte.
Complex, expensive models uuin 8 the partial differential equations of
motion for a large number of 3-dimensional grid cells are .nnoccs-
narily detailed aud expensive. The methodology of a nlulleL'ical model
developed for this t_tudy to solve the energy, mass and laomcngutn cu.-
servatio, equations for iudtvidoal l)uffn of gaseous fuel trap(traCed
from Cite liquid spill has proved to be very satisfactory. Each puff
it; created during a time span of one second and It Is followed at
every otto second Interval until it is no longer flammable. For tile
subject study tile model was run ou tlt(.'ituff produced by the maximum
evaporation rate from the spill when it has its maximtnn area. Any
ocher puff can be followed. Tile model accounts for all thermodynamic
processes of water vapor phase cilanges and sensible heat balance.
Holeeular diffusion is negligible compared to turbulent diffusion.
Turbulent entraiument Is modeled on the current understanding of the
similar turbulent entraiument occoriug in cumulus c2oudn.
10. Considering the spill, spreading) vaporization) dispersion) antl burn_
inn itheet)meua of these fuels ill tile subject craslt scenarios, liquid
hydrogen (L|I9) fuel appears to offer malty advantages when compared to
LCIL4, JP-4, 6r JEI' A.
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7. Jd'_UNYJ_NJ)ATJON5I"01_ I'+UTURI_WORK
The l_{-'t_llUlilJUd_|LiOUll l'Of |IILU_'_ WI)E[_ ['¢,J{ILIV_ LO hal, dt'd V,Olltpu1"IOOLll_ _I!
alld _])t!l:.[lll_!llLill LIJ[ILll,
_,J Auul,ytical _Ludlu_
_- I. Obtalu stable solutie_ of tllu muLhod o_ charactcriutlc_ lllodeJ, s uf
the spi.l.l, l_pl;aadill8 aud vapol:Iza_ou i)roKrams. 'i'hesu l>rogl:ams wl. 1]
|)l'OVid¢ luorc _l_corill_,_p l'el)t'c_ll_ativo d_l_l tel" _h_ d_'_i_ll alld
p_rfo_'mauee p_edlctloxi o£ tile _ou'_.,qu_u_:_oi. liquid spiIJ _:.
2. tool.ode heat trallsf,'rdue tu +urfa¢ ,_couductiuu, flamu t'adltiL+vuand
COIlVO_'tiOll, atlllO_l)ll(lFic huat aud inas8 CUltVUetloll, aud thcrulal capacity
effects in _h.' liquid wq)urizatiuu model.
i 3. lllclude flow _'_;sistalx¢o due to 5oil.iu_ i*%tile liquid spresdlu_ mod_las it may siguifican_ly itapetlea cryugeuic liquid sproadilt5 flow.
I 4. Calibrate tilel;ascous dispersiou model with input conditions provided
from NASA supported test spills of liquid hydrogo[_ at White Sauds
(13), Arthur D. Little Co. spills of liqui a hydrogen lu 1958
(referetx_u 12), aud tile LNG spill test program cot%ductod by Lawreuee
Livermura Natloual Laboratory at China Lake (]4). Tile early calibra-
tion _'un8 against the Whit Sands spi ls arc ot presen ed ill this
i report because of lack of data on the actu_'l test collditions. Tlmsuealibratiou runs are critical t valld t_ tilemodel, although
subjective agreement already exists b,_twcen the model predictions
au4 the aluvles of _h_ test spills.
5. RUu the _ascous disperslull model over differ_iit surface tolnl)crdlturus
• varylt%s tram 233K(-40°_,')to 322K (120o1:) and surface elevations vary.-
iltg _roln sea level up to 1.5 km (4922 ft), aud Willd speeds varyilt8
front d_ad calm to 39 m/s (approximately bO mph),
6. Run tile 8uscous dispcraiou modal for spills of fu_l from sto*'ul_u
tacks that contalt, much 1.auger nmsscs and have sp_:ci£i¢ aurruundiug
II Mrouud topography.
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tili_)_Lillll!L!_ I.J_.i! V_IjI*FIli_.], _l)',ll',l'll _ IIIHI j_b' dlDl Cjl_'lllj¢ ,ll ?All j,ll',' }'di,+¢':,,
I ]IHlib! I!IIIjI_i_jVj_I(!I_ ill dlll_'l'vlil jtl+'l I _,lllil':, I_l Vdl i_,ll:; ;,,dl+' :,j,_,':. I_'
L!Villl_.;_6i_ ] ]dlii_-_ ¢l;till_ll(i' lJJ LJl¢! _l,ll _ I,li I :,| i'ill 'Ill ¢' +,1 httl vJvJlII' . _hihh_'ltl*,cl ',
L_l jill p_li_,l+Ll,d l'l'_i::h lh:e'lldL'lO,
_, jjI-!Vu]O 1) l!ll ;lll¢ll:;|,h';ll IIIOdvl I.I, pl'.dA'l tl.' tYilll!Hlllllvd j,hll,llll h_'dl
j _L::; ;lild Lhl.! _l,_;illsJ¢!ll|, LHIIIWI',_IIII'¢,{; *ll till' {_;I)ltl I'/hhh,_.,_ DdlW:i l,,
L!Vi(IIIIIL_ (*hu _lllydl).'{ll; LO I|ll_;/i_'tij%l!)':i I I'(llll j lillll_'_] ,Ill| Ill(l,' _.b¢' I II:i,.'],lj((,,
'].2 |{X lh ! l' J II,,+ll l ;I ,I 'J'e:; L:_
p," l, _l_L'u ML'_t)Bk_ll_: JLl_J, +l)._lJ Lv,++Lt+, lJ_JLh blll'llL|ll+( stud ll{+11-,bLIFllJlll'+l Wollld
In;ovld++ v+lludbLu UXI)L'I'I_.HI_U ;llld doll;of Lo _:t)l+Itl_l_'c +l+];I,hl:,L +lll+ll_L,i+!+|l
lllod_].+ oJ+ Lhu re|lilt ++prc+a_iUR, v+H).rJmatioll /llld dislli_r+41ou ph_llOlll_!llll,
Thu atlalyLJmal lliUdulm _all bu LIS_'I,I Lt) ]l+[p du:_il.'JX Lit,++ L_:;L++. ill
_LL_oII_ bll_.'ll;Lll_ L_SLS CO_I._I.I pt'Ovtth.+ e:,q>ul'itlt+tllL+l] vux'J.|lc+lLloli o1
['JAIlII_', tt'lllpCL'il_tlL'_,_ alld gkldliltlt)ll f.luRus l+l.'OllXVIII'Jt)IIH SJ?,g! COS| lil}'_)';|"
tlotl+, Th+ +p_lJ. LUSt+ should lllCJUd_ boLh largt+ tiJll,_J_illttdll¢:OlllJtt
Sp_.ll+_ _tlldsl)ills to +iltlLli_tu l):llle]lllv l;Ul)_ttlYu whct'e Io111+ dillY+It, Jolt++
a_e i+Ivulvud.
2, Sunlu £1ow fricLiou Lusts uf a boiling cryogollic liquid spi?usdittl;on
a hot surface should be run Lo sue if tile boil.in B pllUltOlliu+ll+J slgtlif-
iuantly impedes tile liquid spL'uad.
3. Tests of |;he radlatit heal Lranslnisslt.)tt,tUlllp,+!t+attirut'J.su,alld
I structural failure LulnperaLur_s should bu EULt on cab|it wJttduw l}allV++
and typical aircraft fu_ula+u sl_utttru Lo eVdltlO.L_/ L|IU [)_i,SSLtlL_t.'P
hazard._, uspeciall.y wxth cryogntxi_ fucl flamL'_ adJac_ut t_> the+
fusulaBu.
i 4. Grash tusLs of surplus airu_al!t with rul)rCsu_d::_tivu cryo_uulc
tallka_l:. This should bu dullo tO provide a basil; for CUml)ar;isou
with similar tusks which have already buell conducted by Lh_+ FAA
|Isisg sur|)lus 1'2 aircraft with uoIwuntiuual fuels.
5. Du1,iUllutraLu tllu effectiveness of purge syStelllS to UJJll*Ilt+tLufills
hazard ix, uvuu_ t_f onboax'd fu_l l_ak++_ e_p_cLa1:l y with the cryugcllJc
fuels. Also, dUlllUnstraLu t|lu uffuctlvune:_s t)f eau(hLdal_u systunis I.o
dutc_/L till'+ [)l_t_t4t!llC_'. (}l! |U_/I leaks.
It4
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lAPPEND1K A
ANALY'rICAI,RE_UJ,T_{OF TIll",A_}¢CKAFT FUI",I,_A,_II",¢)U._;
DI_PI'R_ION HOI}EL
["o_','ach of Lh,__}¢_narlt){.__Iwt_,.{lu _.'ablu29, theJ:e _s a ploL of
alkltud ° (g) vo_'sus dl_onc '_ (X) o£ the t_'a_ccto_'y ulJ _he .karg_'.t{t puf{, The
time lu secouds at which Lhu }{as_ous fac/ CetlCClitratitin dropn be.low lt:_ J.owe'_Jt
_," flallullabio limit is plotted tit tim end eL the tL'a_c_'t'.tc)l._y. {_ach pl¢;t ,'{how. the
fuel, i_s lowest flawmble mole f_'.tction, circular' spill radius er alia|
spill wldth iu metera, wind speed at i0 meters height in meter_ pet" n¢_,.'.ond,
surface tolnperature Ill kulvtlI, end rclatlvo humidity (d:Lmenulouless).
Each plot is followed by a tabular listing of time, th.wnwlad dlutance
of puff center, puff teulperature_ atlllespherlctempt:raturc at port height }llillos
puff telllperaturc, buoyancy acceluratlon, pvf.f vortical _Jpced, puff height above
ground, overall angle of ascent of puf_ from starting polxtt, puff volume,
3 entrainment speed terms, gas_:ous fuel mole fraction in puff, lu,_'ramental
entrainment volumes through puff sides, top and bottom, radius o_ circular
puff, half thickness of puff, and the leugth and width of an axial puff,
The listing aleo contains the iuput coedltloue: the circular spill
radius or the axial spill width ill meters, the fuel, the surface elevation
in meter's above s_a level, the evaporation rate in meters per second, tile
surface temperature in kelvin, the t'elatlv_ humidity, the atmoepheri,'
_tabillty class number, the willd speed at i0 meters above the ground ill meters
per second, aud tile _,seeus fuel lower flmmmlblo _oucentratlov expressed as
a mole fraction.
All scenarlee ill thle report were rue at zero surface elevation (sea
level_ aud surface temperature of 294°K. Also, all scenarios except for
extra rune of Scenario 4A wlth. Lll2 were run with the most stable atmosphere
(class 6) aud 50% relative humidity ( - 0.5).
115
O0000002-TSB13
MIIXtlltltlll MI_xSIIIIIII ]:v_Olilr_lilllt
_c_'ourhA Fmll (m) (m) (m/gO (_()llllllUll|fl
2A I.II2 1 2,24x 103
2A LI]II4 1,3 0,0iix 10,4
2A JF,4 18,5 2,00x 10'5
2/_, Jot/_ 90 7,00x 10'8 Nofiaillll|nbluCOll(_Olltrat]oll
2t! LII2 2 , 2,59x 10.3
20 LCII4 3,4 _- 4,88x 10'4
_ 20 JP4 40 - 2,00x I0 '0
20 JotA 212 - 7,00x 10,8 NoflamilonbluCLI!ICOIttrotiUll
2C LII2 35 .... 1,94x 10.3
2C LCII4 61 -. 1,11x 10'4
2C JP.4 143 .... 2,00x 10'U
2C JotA 331 - 7.00x 10.0 Noflommu51oCUUlCOiltratio!l
3A LH2 0,14 2,50_ 10` 3
3A LCII4 0,12 • 1.06x 10"3
3A JP.4 1.18 2.00x 10.6
3A ,lotA 4,52 7,00x 10.0 Noflal_lmoblecoucent.etion
30 Ltl2 0,34 2,50x 10.3
30 LCIt4 il.32 9.87x 10.4
30 JP.4 2,94 2,00x 10"6
38 JotA 11.20 7,00x 10-8 NoflommabloCOltCOlltrotJOlt
3C L.H2 12,4 2.51x 10.3
3C LCIt4 20 2,30x 10.4
3C JP.4 100 2,00x 10-0
3[; JotA 400 7.00x 10-8 NoflnmmaSleconcelltratiou
4A LH2 48 -- 1.84x 10.3
4A LCH4 77 ._ 1,00x 10,4
4A JP.4 175 - 2.00x 10-8
4A JotA 406 ._ 7,00x 10.0 Noflemmobhcmtceiltratimt
48 LIt2 20 .- 2,36x 10'3
40 LCH4 29 - 1,52x 10.4
4U JP.4 74 - 2.011x 10"9
40 JetA 171 - 7,00x 10-8 NoflemmableCOOlCezdration
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